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Abstract
The exchange rate is one of the key prices in an economy. By directly affecting
the behaviour and the decision making of economic agents such as households, en-
trepreneurs, governments, banks and other financial institutions it has a crucial
impact on many important macroeconomic variables. The exchange rate can func-
tion as a vital anchor and a stabilising force. However, particularly against the
backdrop of increasingly globalised capital flows, each exchange rate regime holds
its specific immanent risks. The present dissertation delves in three chapters into
two particular exchange rate regime related risk aspects - the peril of a currency cri-
sis and the possibility of an inflation acceleration in the wake of the euro adoption
hotly debated in most of the euro candidate countries.
In the first chapter we thus propose exploiting the term structure of relative interest
rates to obtain estimates of changes in the timing of a currency crisis as perceived
by market participants. Our early warning indicator can be used to evaluate the
relative probability of a crisis occurring in one week as compared to a crisis happen-
ing after one week but in less than a month. We give empirical evidence that the
indicator performs well for two important currency crises in Eastern Europe: the
crisis in the Czech Republic in 1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998.
Also the second chapter deals with early warning mechanisms for currency crises. We
tackle explicitly the issue of model uncertainty in the framework of binary variable
models of currency crises. Using Bayesian model averaging techniques, we assess the
robustness of the explanatory variables proposed in the recent literature for both
static and dynamic models. Our results indicate that the variables belonging to
the set of macroeconomic fundamentals proposed by the literature are very fragile
determinants of the occurrence of currency crises. The results improve if the crisis
index identifies a crisis period instead of a crisis occurrence. In this setting, the
extent of real exchange rate misalignment and financial market indicators appear as
robust determinants of crisis periods.
In contrast, using the case study of the Czech Republic in the last chapter we analyse
relevant macro and microeconomic forces driving inflation with a particular focus
on how these inflation channels are likely to change in the wake of the euro adop-
tion. We employ an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model combined with
the Bayesian model averaging and a Bayesian model selection technique based on
posterior model inclusion probabilities. As a side-product we estimate the time-
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varying natural rate of interest purged from the risk premia which is, to our best
knowledge, the first attempt to do so for the Czech Republic. Our results suggest
that the costs attributable to the lack of koruna appreciation after euro adoption are
likely to be rather low. In contrast, a low inflation environment and a harmonization
of the business cycles between the Czech Republic and the euro area are essential for
a smooth inflation development after the euro adoption. The fulfilment of the Maas-
tricht inflation criterion should not be enforced, however, by non-standard policy
measures. The potential inflationary effect of the changeover cannot be eliminated
altogether but it may well be substantially reduced.
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Chapter 1
An “Almost-Too-Late” Warning
Mechanism For Currency Crises1
1.1 Introduction
The abundance and severity of currency crises and speculative attacks over the past
15 years has spawned a rebirth of interest among researchers, politicians and cen-
tral bankers in these events. Currency crises tend to be painful and costly for the
affected economy and usually aﬄict the population immediately. Two recent cases
illustrate this. The Argentine financial turmoil of 2002, one of the most violent
currency crises on record, induced an increase in the poverty rate of more than 50%
and drove nearly two out of three Argentines below the poverty line. The Indonesian
crisis in 1998 caused a drop in GDP of more than 13% within a year.
Considering the spectrum of distinct exchange rate arrangements, ranging from to-
tally flexible exchange rates to monetary unions and currency boards, there seems to
be ample evidence that intermediate regimes such as fixed and crawling pegs or fluc-
tuation bands are most prone to speculative attacks. For this reason, countries have
increasingly abandoned intermediate regimes for arrangements at the extremes (see
e.g. Fischer, 2001).2 Yet today an unravelling of current global imbalances threatens
even a large economy with a flexible exchange rate regime like the United States with
abrupt and significant currency depreciation (see Roubini and Setser, 2005). Admit-
tedly, experts who consider this possibility as remote likely outnumber proponents
1This chapter is based on a joint work with my adviser, Prof. Dr. Jesu´s Crespo-Cuaresma.
2Notwithstanding the fact that de jure exchange rate regimes need not coincide with de facto
ones (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).
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of the view that the Bretton Woods 2 system of exchange rates is unsustainable (see
e.g. Dooley et al, 2004; or Hausmann and Sturzenegger, 2005). However, there are
undoubtedly countries whose fundamental macroeconomic and/or political condi-
tions make them vulnerable to a speculative attack. Hungary, for example, which
still maintains an intermediate exchange rate arrangement, was running a current
account and fiscal deficit in 2005 roughly 2.5 times greater than Argentina before
its devastating crisis hit.
Motivated by the damaging potential effects of currency crises, both the theoreti-
cal and empirical literature has received renewed attention from researchers. Not
only have new generations of currency crisis models been developed in response to
unsatisfactory theoretical instruments to describe and explain causes and frequency
of crises in the 1990s, economists have also started pondering ways to predict the
timing of such events (e.g. both the Mexican crisis in 1994 and the Asian crisis in
1997 essentially caught the international community flat-footed). Unfortunately, the
forecasting models proposed over the past few years have generally demonstrated
only fair-to-middling predictive accuracy.
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (KLR) pioneered quantitative currency crisis early-
warning systems (EWS) with their “indicator” model developed in a series of papers
(see Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998). The KLR approach monitors the evo-
lution of several economic variables (indicators) such that when a variable deviates
from its “normal” level beyond a threshold value, a signal is said to be issued. The
threshold value is chosen as follows. Let S represent the number of periods in which
the indicator issued a good signal (a crisis signal which was followed by a crisis, or
a non-crisis signal which was not followed by a crisis) and let N denote the number
of periods in which the indicator issued a bad signal or “noise”. For each indicator,
KLR find the “optimal” threshold, defined as that threshold that minimizes the
noise-to-signal ratio, N/S. Eventually, a composite indicator is constructed as an
average of indicators, weighted by frequency of correct predictions.
Following KLR, academics and economists working in the private sector produced
a wide range of currency crisis forecasting models. Unlike the indicator approach,
most are variations of logit or probit regressions. It is noteworthy that the vast
majority of such models, including the KLR model, use fundamental data such as
current account, exchange rate overvaluation or export growth as explanatory vari-
ables. The variable choices are predominantly inspired by the three generations of
theories of balance-of-payment crises, but they tend to be limited by availability
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of data. The academic models tend to be long-sight approaches with forecasting
horizons of up to two years, while their private-sector counterparts usually focus on
a brief windows of one to three months (the Deutsche Bank’s DB Alarm Clock, for
instance, has a horizon of one month, while the prediction horizon of the original
KLR contribution is of 24 months).
Berg et al. (2004) not only give a very helpful overview of the abundant literature on
EWS, they also address the question of how much, if any, out-of-sample forecasting
value derives from EWS. They put particular emphasis on the potential performance
of models in real time and reach rather disappointing conclusions. Only one of the
long-horizon forecasts under consideration (the KLR model forecast) provides bet-
ter accuracy compared with pure guesswork and non-model based predictions, while
short-horizon private-sector approaches by and large perform poorly. In contrast,
Anzuini and Gandolfo (2003), when testing whether the KLR would have forecast
the Thai crisis of 1997, conclude the indicator approach has strong ex-post explana-
tory power but quite limited predictive abilities.
In this paper, we propose exploiting the term structure of relative interest rates
to obtain estimates of changes in the timing of a currency crisis as perceived by
market participants. To our knowledge, only a handful of researchers have used this
approach. The essence of our model is based on the seminal work by Collins (1984),
who applied her analysis to the March 1983 devaluation of the French franc relative
to the German Deutsche mark. The Collins approach was also used in Anzuini and
Gandolfo (2003), who compare the predictive power of the KLR approach and the
Collins model. They conclude that the Collins non-structural approach forecasts
well but does not explain, while the opposite is true for the structural KLR model.
This approach does not rely on the estimation of thresholds (eventually common
to a group of countries) based on fundamentals, but instead extracts expectations
on the timing of the crisis from country-specific interest rate data. Compared with
the KLR and other EWS, this approach has several important advantages. First,
it requires no definition of a crisis in terms of percentage devaluation/depreciation,
which tends to be rather arbitrary in the literature. Moreover, no pooling of data is
necessary to obtain a sample of a usable size. For each country in question, only its
own specific data may be used. In addition, as the model uses only very basic data
such as interest and exchange rates; it is not heavily limited by data availability.
We construct an early warning indicator that can be used to evaluate the relative
probability of a crisis occurring in one week as compared to a crisis happening after
one week but in less than a month. Subsequently, we provide empirical evidence
17
that the indicator performs well for the currency crises in the Czech Republic in
1997 and in Russia in 1998.
This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section the theoretical model is
developed. In section 1.3 we apply the indicator to the crisis of the koruna and the
ruble in 1997 and 1998, respectively. Section 1.4 concludes and sets up paths of
further research.
1.2 Uncovered interest rate parity and currency crises
Recent research on the predictive power of markets suggests that markets are capa-
ble to aggregate disperse information and that market-based forecasts are usually
fairly accurate. Moreover, such forecasts typically outperform alternative forecast-
ing tools, including highly sophisticated forecasting models, polls or expert surveys
(see e.g. Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). The basic objective of our analysis is to
examine the ability of foreign exchange markets to foresee exceptional exchange
rate devaluations in fixed exchange rate arrangements. In substance, the following
model is based on the work by Collins (1984) (see also Anzuini and Gandolfo, 2003),
designed to study the behavior of speculators prior to the French franc realignment
in 1983. Our theoretical setting extends and generalizes the original one in several
aspects. On the one hand, we explicitly take into account the potential existence
of a time-varying risk premium, assumed constant in the references above. On the
other hand, we also allow for the possibility of appreciation expectations in order
for the approach to be usable for exchange rates in target zones or other types of
intermediate exchange rate regimes.
The aim of our study is to construct an indicator based on basic economic theory
(the uncovered interest rate parity, henceforth UIP) to proxy the change in the
time structure of the underlying expected probabilities of devaluation implied by
the relative term structure of interest rates. Accommodating risk aversion, the
uncovered interest rate parity can be modified as
(1 + it,k)
(1 + i∗t,k)
=
E(et+k|Ωt)
et
+ ρt,k (1.1)
where et is the spot exchange rate at time t, defined as the price of foreign currency
in domestic currency units, it,k and i
∗
t,k are, respectively, the domestic and foreign
interest rates at time t on deposits with maturity k. E(et+k|Ωt) stands for the ex-
pected exchange rate in period t + k given the information available at time t (the
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information set Ωt) and ρt,k represents a premium for risks not immediately related
to the exchange rate movements (e.g. country default risk).3
Equation (1.1) states that the relative yield on domestic deposits of a given maturity
is equal to the expected exchange rate movement and some well defined country risk
premium. Rewriting (1.1), we obtain
E(et+k|Ωt) =
[
(1 + it,k)
(1 + i∗t,k)
− ρt,k
]
et . (1.2)
From the perspective of the market agent forming expectations in time t the ex-
change rate can either remain stable, appreciate or depreciate. Therefore, the ex-
change rate expected as of t for the period t + k is a weighted average of these
scenarios, where the weight assigned to each possible exchange rate movement is
the subjectively perceived probability of these events. Formally, this implies that
E(et+k|Ωt) = (1− pit,k)st,k + pit,kzt,k (1.3)
where zt,k is the expected exchange rate in period t + k in case of devaluation,
zt,k = γt,ket, where γt,k > 1, and st,k is the expected exchange rate conditional on
no devaluation (in other words, the exchange rate remains stable or appreciates),
st,k = δt,ket, where δt,k ≤ 1. The subjective probability of devaluation having
occurred after k periods is therefore pit,k. In addition, along the lines of Collins
(1984), we shall assume that the rate of depreciation or appreciation does not depend
on the temporal horizon, so that δt,k = δt and γt,k = γt. It follows that
E(et+k|Ωt) = [δt + (γt − δt)pit,k] et, (1.4)
which can be substituted in (1.2) so as to establish the link between relative yields
and the subjective devaluation probability:
3In our specification the risk premium is assumed to be unrelated to the exchange rate. In certain
cases, it may be reasonable to assume that the exchange rate level has an effect on the risk premium.
For instance, if domestic debt is denominated mostly in the currency of the foreign country, one
might expect that after a substantial devaluation the probability of default and thus the risk
premium in the domestic country would rise. This effect can be easily incorporated in the model
by specifying a functional form linking the exchange rate to the risk premium. If the relationship
is assumed to be linear in the exchange rate with a slope that is not maturity-dependent, the
results presented in this section remain unchanged. For a general functional specification of this
relationship, the model could still be applied after calibrating some extra parameters. We do not
follow this avenue in the present study, although this generalization is proposed as an interesting
future path of research.
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αt,k = δt + (γt − δt)pit,k + ρt,k, (1.5)
where αt,k = (1+ it,k)/(1+ i
∗
t,k). The essential term in equation (1.5) is the perceived
probability of a devaluation between time t and t+k, pit,k. Anticipating the empirical
application of the method, we will restrict ourselves to devaluations occurring within
each of the time intervals corresponding to the maturities of the available time
deposits. If there are J−1 different maturities of deposits ordered from the shortest
to the longest, there are J possible states of the world at time t. An exceptional
devaluation might occur before the time implied by the shortest maturity available,
between maturities of deposits k and k + 1 or, finally, there might be a devaluation
after the longest deposit matures. Defining as ηt,j the probability of a devaluation
happening between period t+ j − 1 and t+ j,
pit,k =
k∑
i=1
ηt,i, (1.6)
which implies that
αt,k − (δt + ρt,k)
(γt − δt) =
k∑
i=1
ηt,j. (1.7)
For the sake of illustration let us suppose that there are two maturities k = 7 and
k = 30 days (this will be the case in the empirical illustration in the following
section). Then, it can be easily shown that
ηt,7 =
αt,7 − (δt + ρt,7)
(γt − δt) , (1.8)
ηt,30 =
αt,30 − αt,7 − (ρt,30 − ρt,7)
(γt − δt) . (1.9)
By taking ratios or log-ratios of the expressions above, we can identify changes in
the time structure of subjective probabilities of a devaluation implied by the term
structure of interest rates. Furthermore, the ratios are independent of the assumed
size of the devaluation, γt. Assume an ordering of maturities, where the shortest
one is normalized to one, the second shortest is two, and so on. In particular, the
indicator proposed, Ij,s,t, aimed at comparing the probabilities of devaluation at
horizons j and s (j < s), corresponding to two observed maturities, is
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Ij,s,t =
 log
(
αt,j−αt,j−1−(ρt,j−ρt,j−1)
αt,s−αt,s−1−(ρt,s−ρt,s−1)
)
for j, s > 1,
log
(
αt,j−(δt+ρt,j)
αt,s−αt,s−1−(ρt,s−ρt,s−1)
)
for j = 1, s > 1.
(1.10)
In order to make (1.10) operational, the expected appreciation parameter, δt and
the respective risk premia for each maturity need to be imputed. If we assume that
δt = 1 and ρt,i = 0 ∀i, (1.10) boils down to the expression put forward in Collins
(1984). The problem with this setting is that it can lead to negative probability
estimates for empirical applications, and thus log-ratios which are not defined. The
inclusion of risk premia and potential appreciation expectations in (1.10) allows us
to elaborate corrections of the basic indicator in order to avoid negative probability
ratios.
The problem of negative probability ratios is particularly important when dealing
with data from Eastern European transition economies. Taking the simple case
without risk premium (i.e., setting ρt,s = 0 ∀s above) and δt = 1, it can be easily
seen that for a relatively flat yield curve in the domestic economy, if it,7 tends to be
higher than it,30, negative values can be obtained in the numerator of (1.9). This
constellation, caused by a downward-sloping yield curve in the domestic economy, is
not unusual in the recent history of Eastern European economies, where sustained
disinflationary experiences rendered a term structure of interest rates with lower
nominal interest rates in longer maturities.
A simple correction to the simple setting based on future expected inflation can be
put forward to link the setting including risk premium to a yield curve which is
potentially negatively sloped. In a disinflationary framework, with E(∆pt,30|Ωt) <
E(∆pt,7|Ωt), where ∆pt,g is the inflation rate for the period t to t + g, we can
correct the interest rate with longer maturity (we denote the corrected rate by icorr.t,30 )
by substracting (E(∆pt,30|Ωt) − E(∆pt,7|Ωt)) from the original rate, so that the
corrected numerator of equation (1.9) for the case without risk premium is given by
αcorr.t,30 − αt,7 =
1 + icorr.t,30
1 + i∗t,30
− 1 + it,7
1 + i∗t,7
=
=
1 + it,30 + E(∆pt,7|Ωt)− E(∆pt,30|Ωt)
1 + i∗t,30
− 1 + it,7
1 + i∗t,7
=
=
1 + it,30
1 + i∗t,30
− 1 + it,7
1 + i∗t,7
+
E(∆pt,7|Ωt)− E(∆pt,30|Ωt)
1 + i∗t,30
=
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=αt,30 − αt,7 + E(∆pt,7|Ωt)− E(∆pt,30|Ωt)
1 + i∗t,30
.
In other words, ρt,7 and ρt,30 in equation (1.9) may be interpreted as, respectively,
E(∆pt,7|Ωt)
1+i∗t,30
and E(∆pt,30|Ωt)
1+i∗t,30
if the basic setting is employed and long-maturity interest
rates are corrected for expected disinflation. In practice, this correction could be
carried out for maturities of 7 and 30 days , for instance, by replacing E(∆pt,7|Ωt)
with the realized inflation level at time t and using a time series model in order to
obtain forecasts for ∆pt,30. In our empirical application we report the results of such
a correction based on inflation forecasts.
1.3 The warning mechanism in action in the Czech and Rus-
sian currency crises
In this section, we apply the indicator put forward above to data from two recent
currency crises in Eastern Europe: the Czech Republic crisis in May 1997 and the
Russian crisis in 1998.4 In both cases, we describe the economic framework in which
the currency crises took place and present the real-time estimates of our indicator
for both economies during the crisis period.
1.3.1 The 1997 crisis in the Czech Republic
In the early 1990s, the Czech Republic introduced a tight peg of the koruna to the
Deutsche mark (DM) and the US dollar (USD). The currency basket used was made
up of 65% DM and 35% USD from May 1993. The peg had fluctuation bands of
± 0.5% up to February 1996 and ± 7.5% from February 1996 until the May 1997
crisis, which materialized with the abandonment of the peg on May 26, 1997 for a
managed float regime. The trade balance in the Czech Republic, which had been sys-
tematically positive since the break-up of Czechoslovakia, turned negative in 1996,
with a corresponding slowing of economic growth. Horva´th (1999) interprets the
current account deficit in the Czech Republic as a reflection of insufficient private
savings, which, coupled with the institutional framework of the Czech banking sec-
tor at that time, made the deficit unsustainable. Furthermore, the real exchange
rate appreciated persistently and continuously in the period 1992-1997. Although
trend appreciation is a common phenomenon in transition economies, which can be
(at least partly) explained through the Balassa-Samuelson effect by differential pro-
4The choice of the crises is exclusively based on data availability.
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ductivity increases, Begg (1998) and Horva´th (1999) argue that the real exchange
rate dynamics implied a loss of competitiveness of the Czech economy. The adverse
macroeconomic framework, together with an unstable political environment, led to
a speculative attack on the koruna and a change in the exchange rate regime in May
1997.
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Exchange rate: Czech koruna versus basket (65% DM, 35%USD)
Figure 1.1: Czech Koruna: Exchange rate, January 1997-June 1997
Figure 1.1 shows the daily exchange rate of the Czech koruna against the basket in
the period January-June 1997. The vertical line corresponds to the abandonment
of the peg. As it can be seen in Figure 1.1, the exchange rate remained inside the
± 7.5% bands during the turmoil preceding the change in the exchange rate regime,
and depreciated strongly as soon as the managed float regime was in place. The fact
that the monetary authorities were able to keep the koruna inside the fluctuation
bands was mainly due to the heavy central bank interventions taking place in the
week preceding the breakdown of the peg (see Horva´th, 1999).
We calculated the indicator given by (1.10) using two different maturities for the
Czech koruna exchange rate against both the DM and the USD for the period rang-
ing from January 1st, 1997 to the abandonment of the peg on May 27th, 1997. We
used the daily interbank rates with maturity one week (it,7 and i
∗
t,7) and one month
23
(it,30 and i
∗
t,30) for the Czech Republic and, alternatively, Germany and the US.
5
The main reason behind the choice of these maturities for our indicator is based on
exploiting differences in interest rates in the very short run, a time domain which
has not been assessed in the literature on currency crises hitherto.6
The yield curve implied by the term structure of interbank rates in the Czech Re-
public is downward-sloping for most of the sample. If we were to obtain an indicator
based on the assumptions imposed in Collins (1984) (that is, imposing δt = 1 and
ρj = 0 ∀j in (1.10)), the results would imply negative values in the argument of the
log-ratio corresponding to ηt,30, since αt,30 tends to be systematically smaller than
αt,7 for the sample at hand. A possible way to overcome this problem would be to
redesign the log-ratio of probabilities by adding a constant to the numerator and
denominator of the expressions in the log of (1.10) after setting ρt,i = 0 for all i. In
our setting, this can be reconciled with the existence of a certain maturity structure
in the risk premium, such that, for example, ρt,j − ρt,j−1 = ρt,s − ρt,s−1 = c < 0
∀j > 1, j < s. For the indicator related to the shortest maturity, appreciation ex-
pectations (so that δ < 1) can also lead to the same type of correction. In Figure
1.2 we show the resulting indicator after adding 0.3 to the denominator of the ex-
pression for I7,30,t in (1.10), so as to keep the structure of relative changes in the
original estimates of ηt,7 and ηt,30 but avoid negative relative probabilities. The re-
sults presented in Figure 1.2 correspond to using the US as the foreign economy, but
are identical to those using Germany. The results are also qualitatively identical for
constants different from 0.3, as long as they avoid negative values in the argument of
the log ratio. Furthermore, the results are also similar if the indicator is constructed
under the assumption that k = 7 is not the shortest maturity.
Changes in the indicator can be interpreted as changes in the perceived probabil-
ity of a crisis occurring in the following week as compared to a crisis happening in
the period delimited by day seven and day thirty. The indicator remains practically
constant from January to mid-May, and starts increasing dramatically on May 16th,
reflecting a strong change in the perceptions of investors on the potential timing of a
devaluation. The increase is strong and sustained until May 28th, and from that day
onwards the indicator slowly decreases to a low level, comparable with the pre-crisis
period. The indicator performs therefore extraordinarily as a (very-)short-term in-
5The source of the data used in this study is Datastream.
6The results are mostly similar if different pairs of short-term interest rates are used. The
resulting indicator using maturity combinations of 7, 30 and 90 days presents similar properties to
those presented in this section. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 1.2: Czech Koruna: Exchange rate, January 1997-June 1997 and I7,30,t
dicator of the crisis, and could be used ex-post as a device for dating the de facto
occurrence of the crisis (since, de jure, the change of the exchange rate regime would
be the corresponding indicator).
Alternatively, we also made use of the daily one month forward rates (eft,30) for the
koruna/USD exchange rate, which are available for the period under study, in order
to get real-time estimates of ρt,30 in the framework of the covered interest rate parity,
given by
ρt,30 =
(1 + it,30)
(1 + i∗t,30)
− e
f
t,30
et
. (1.11)
Using these estimates we can include the dynamics of the risk premium in the indi-
cator. Since due to lack of data we do not have estimates of ρt,7 for the pre-crisis
period, let us assume that the dynamics of ρt,7 are similar to those of our estimate
of ρt,30, although the level may be different, so that we assume ρt,30 < ρt,7 in order
to avoid negative probabilities, keeping the assumption δt = 1.
7 The resulting
indicator is plotted in Figure 1.3. Although the long-run dynamics of the indicator
are not affected by this correction, it should be noted that the resulting estimate of
7Seven-days forward exchange rates for the crisis period (but not for the pre-crisis period) are
available, and confirm that the resulting risk premium for seven days was higher than ρt,30.
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the risk premium for the Czech Republic is far from being constant for the period
considered. In particular, the speculative attack that lead to the crisis is identified
as a strong increase of the risk premium. It was therefore not possible to foresee
in advance if the inclusion of this correction would affect the properties of the in-
dicator. We also computed the corresponding indicator for the German case, using
a synthetic forward rate (since forward rates for the koruna/DM are not available
for the period) obtained from other forward cross-rates and the resulting graph is
similar to Figure 1.3.8
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Figure 1.3: Czech Koruna: Exchange rate, January 1997-June 1997 and I7,30,t with
risk premium adjustment
The results concerning the leading indicator properties of the log-ratio are qualita-
tively similar to those obtained without the risk premium adjustment, although the
indicator series is now relatively more volatile in the pre-crisis period.
We also performed the correction based on inflation expectations as follows. We
used the realized inflation rate at time t as a proxy for E(∆pt,7|Ωt), and for each
period we estimated different models in order to obtain forecasts of ∆pt,30 (∆pt+1
in monthly notation), E(∆pt,30|Ωt) using data up to time t. This correction is not
8Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 1.4: Standardized I7,30,t changes: Czech Republic
able to overcome the negative probabilities if simple autoregressive processes with
and without deterministic trends are used as forecasting models. Since these parsi-
monious models tend to forecast future inflation relatively well, the correction is not
able to render positive values of ηt,30 unless the data generating process assumed for
inflation contains nonlinear deterministic trends that systematically produce strong
disinflationary forecasts.9
Until now, no reference has been made to the size of the change in the indicator lead-
ing to a crisis signal. While several methods can be used to evaluate the threshold
leading to significant signals, an extremely simple one based on the standardization
of changes in the indicator seems to perform well. In Figure 1.4 we present the
changes in the indicator at each period t standardized using the average change
and standard deviation realized up to period t − 1. We start the exercise in April
1997 based on indicator changes ranging from January 1997 and we also plot the
5% critical values corresponding to a standard normal distribution. The first sig-
nificant change takes place on April 16th, and no false signal is sent before the crisis.
While the aim of the indicator proposed is to serve as a short-term leading indicator
for exchange rate crises, we study whether also in tranquil times relative changes
9Detailed results on the correction are available from the authors upon request.
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of the indicator contain information about future changes in the exchange rate.
This will be done by performing a simple out-of-sample forecasting exercise for the
pre-crisis sample. The forecasting abilities of an autoregressive model on the first
difference of the (log) exchange rate of the Czech koruna against the USD and the
DM will be compared to those of a simple vector autoregressive (VAR) model includ-
ing changes in the exchange rate and the indicator with risk premium adjustment.
The forecasting exercise is carried out as follows. Using data from January 1st to
April 1st, 1997, an autoregressive model is estimated for the log changes in the ex-
change rate, together with a VAR for the vector of log changes in the exchange rate
and the first difference of the indicator. In both cases, the lag length of the model is
chosen so as to minimize AIC for the sample. Using the estimated models, out-of-
sample forecasts are obtained for 1 to 30 (working) days ahead, and the forecasting
errors are computed by comparing the forecasts with the real data. The observa-
tion corresponding to April 2nd is added to the sample, the models are estimated
again and new out-of-sample forecasts are obtained. This procedure is repeated
until all available observations have been used. In our case, since we are interested
in the informational content of the indicator in the pre-crisis period, the full sam-
ple used ranges from January 1st to May 20th. With the forecasts, we compute the
root mean square forecasting error (RMSFE) for each forecasting horizon, defined as
RMSEh =
√∑Nh
n=1(en − eˆn)2/Nh, where Nh is the number of h-steps ahead forecasts
computed, en is the actual value of the exchange rate and eˆn is the corresponding
forecast.
Table 1.1 presents the results of the forecasting exercise. For each exchange rate con-
sidered, the improvement of RMSFE for the VAR model over the simple autoregres-
sion is presented for different forecasting horizons. The results of the corresponding
Diebold-Mariano test (Diebold and Mariano, 1995) for equality of forecasting abil-
ity is also reported in each case. The forecasting abilities of the model including
information on the indicator are superior to those of the autoregressive model for
all forecasting horizons in the case of the US dollar, with marginal improvements
on the forecasting error averaging 0.75% over the 30-day forecasting horizons. Al-
though the improvement is very modest, it should be pointed out that the particular
exchange rate regime of the Czech Republic for the period considered limited signif-
icantly the volatility of exchange rate movements for the period. The improvements
are furthermore statistically significant for forecasting horizons of 5-days ahead and
longer. The results are not so positive for the DM, where our indicator does not
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seem to possess information on future exchange rate developments for quiet periods.
For the one-month forecast horizon the model including the indicator improves in
RMSFE over the simple AR model, albeit not significantly.
Exchange rate: Czech koruna/USD
Steps ahead RMSFE difference Diebold-Mariano test Observ.
1 -1.271 % -0.705 34
5 -0.998 % -1.845∗∗ 30
10 -0.408 % -1.687∗∗ 25
15 -0.686 % -1.955∗∗ 20
20 -0.757 % -2.496∗∗∗ 15
25 -0.773 % -1.370∗ 10
30 -1.267 % -3.474∗∗∗ 5
Exchange rate: Czech koruna/DM
Steps ahead RMSFE difference Diebold-Mariano test Observ.
1 0.156 % 1.053 34
5 0.062 % 0.866 30
10 0.052 % 0.679 25
15 0.050 % 0.787 20
20 0.027 % 0.509 15
25 0.066 % 0.867 10
30 -0.044 % -0.967 5
The column “RMSFE difference” is the difference between the RMSFE of the VAR model and
the AR model as percentage of the RMSFE of the AR model. The column “Diebold-Mariano
test” refers to the Diebold-Mariano test for equal forecasting error (Diebold and Mariano, 1995).
*(**)[***] stands for significance at the 10%(5%)[1%] level.
Table 1.1: Pre-crisis forecasting exercise: VAR vs. AR
1.3.2 The 1998 crisis in Russia
The Russian Central Bank announced in November 1997 that, starting January
1998, the ruble would be targeted at a central rate of 6.2 rubles/dollar, with a fluc-
tuation band of ± 15%. However, the volatility of the ruble/dollar exchange rate
was minimal in the months preceding the crisis (the standard deviation of percent-
age changes in the exchange rate was 0.002 in the period January-August, 1998).
On August 17th, 1998, the Russian government announced the devaluation of the
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ruble by the end of the year, defaulted on its government debt and declared a 90-day
moratorium on foreign debt. On August 26th the Russian Central Bank declared
that the fixed exchange rate could not be supported any longer and on September
2nd, 1998 the Russian ruble was floated.10
Using the corresponding interbank interest rate data for Russia and the US, we con-
struct the indicator for the dynamics of the relative probability of a crisis occurring
in seven days as compared to the crisis taking place in the interval delimited by
seven and thirty days. The same problems as for the case of the Czech Republic
come up if the indicator proposed by Collins (1984) is used, since the probability
ratio turns negative in some periods due to the downward-sloping term structure
of Russian interbank rates. Figure 1.5 presents the Russian ruble/USD exchange
rate together with the indicator I7,30,t for the period April-September, 1998, after
assuming δt = 1, ρ7 = 0 and adding a constant (one in this case) to the denominator
of the expression in (1.10) so as to avoid negative implied probabilities. The shaded
area delimits the period of time starting with the announcement of the devaluation
and ending with the floatation of the ruble.
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Figure 1.5: Russian ruble: Exchange rate, April 1998-October 1998 and I7,30,t
10For an excellent account of the Russian crisis, see Kharas et al. (2001)
30
The first relevant feature of I7,30,t is the fact that it has a positive trend in the
period under study. This implies that investors systematically changed their expec-
tations of the timing of an exchange rate crisis in the months preceding the actual
occurrence of the Russian crisis. In this sense, as the crisis approached, they tended
to consider the event increasingly imminent. Apart from this medium-run trend
in I7,30,t, the indicator presents relevant increases in the end of May, mid July and
a global peak following the announcement of the devaluation, which precedes the
change in the exchange rate regime by seven (working) days. The first peak, on
May 28th, takes place right after the Central Bank increased key interest rate to
150 % and is followed by a series of interventions in the coming days (involving the
expenditure of $1 billion in reserves) in a successful attempt to defend the ruble (see
e.g. Chiodo and Owyang, 2002). The indicator declines in the following days, and
follows the positive trend that dominates the full period. The second signal of a shift
in expectations to an imminent devaluation takes place starting in early July. The
start of the increase coincides with the Russian parliament’s postponement of the
policy reforms needed to qualify for IMF loans. Expectations of crisis timing shift
away from one week with the final approval of an IMF emergency loan to Russia in
mid-July. Finally, our indicator increases dramatically in the period August 10-18
in parallel to the collapse of the stock and bond markets (August 13) and in spite of
Boris Yeltsin’s declarations that “there will be no devaluation” of the ruble following
an emergency parliamentary session on August 14. Our indicator only stabilizes on
August 21, when the Russian crisis can already be felt in markets all around the
world. Although our indicator peaks when the crisis is already being felt, the in-
crease in I7,30,t is strong up to seven days before the devaluation announcement. The
dynamics of the indicator remain unchanged if the inflation expectation correction
is carried out, or if the 90-day interest rate is used as the long edge of the maturity
comparison. 11
Figure 1.6 presents the standardized changes in the indicator computed with in-
formation up to period t for each observation. The indicator data used for the
standardization starts in January 1997, and the values corresponding to the sample
under study are presented in the figure together with the 5% critical values. The
two peaks of the indicator which did not result in a crisis do not actually appear
significant at the 5% level, while the crisis signal does.
The minimal volatility of the ruble/US dollar exchange rate in the pre-crisis period
makes an out-of-sample exercise such as the one carried out for the Czech Republic
11Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 1.6: Standardized I7,30,t changes: Russia
useless in this context. To sum up, our indicator is able to identify both specula-
tive pressures that were successfully combated by the central bank in the pre-crisis
period, and starts signalling the occurrence of the impending crisis six days before
the official announcement of the devaluation.
1.4 Summary and conclusions
The increased frequency and strength of currency crises in recent years has motivated
researchers in both public and private institutions to develop effective early-warning
systems for currency crises. A vast majority of existing approaches uses similar
macroeconomic variables to forecast the timing of financial distress. In our opinion,
fundamental data are perfectly suited to identifying the set of potentially vulnerable
countries and, possibly, to explaining crises after the fact. However, in our opinion,
the desired forecasting instrument needs to focus strongly on market sentiment as
it is the participants on foreign exchange markets who eventually trigger a crisis.
Investor sentiment is much more sensitive to short-term news and incoming signals
than to underlying long-term fundamentals. Along these lines, recent research sug-
gests that market-based forecasting tools possess fair predictive power and usually
outperform alternative instruments in terms of accuracy.
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Thus, based on simple economic theory and exploiting the term structure of relative
interest rates, we constructed a very short-term early-warning indicator to evaluate
relative probabilities of a crisis occurring in different time horizons. Subsequently,
we applied the indicator to data from two recent Eastern European currency crises:
the Czech koruna crisis in 1997 and Russia ruble crisis in 1998. We found that
our indicator performs extraordinarily as a (very) short-term predictor of a crisis in
both considered cases. We also provided evidence that the indicator contains extra
information about future short-run exchange rate changes.
In principle, the indicator put forward can be interpreted as a dating instead of
a predicting mechanism for currency crises. While at least part of the dynamics
preceding the breakdown of the peg in both cases studied are to be interpreted
as attempts of the respective central bank to defend its currency, the econometric
analysis carried out in the paper shows however that the dynamics of the indica-
tor contains useful information about future movements of the exchange rate. In
that sense, our indicator can be seen as a measure of stress in the foreign exchange
market. This is better illustrated in the case of the Russian crisis, where a positive
trend in the behaviour of the indicator can be interpreted a a continuous increase of
the crisis risk, and the medium-run dynamics is able to identify speculative attacks
prior to the crisis.
As seen in the Russian case study, even false alarms from the market need to be
taken seriously by central bankers and governments and all available short-term
measures should be implemented. Likening our indicator to a thermometer, a high
body temperature does not necessarily imply serious illness, but is always a reason
for concern. In that sense, our indicator is useful for monetary policy institutions as
an extra signalling instrument to complement long-run warning mechanisms. Several
improvements to the methodology used in this piece of research can be implemented
to refine the indicator. Among possible avenues of research, using information on
the time-varying nature of interest rate volatility to proxy for developments in the
risk premium may lead to improvements in the signalling properties of the estimator.
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Chapter 2
On the Determinants of Currency
Crises: The Role of Model
Uncertainty1
2.1 Introduction
Over the course of the last couple of decades several parts of the world have experi-
enced rather harsh financial market crises, sometimes repeatedly, and mostly accom-
panied by painful real shocks. The very last wave of such turmoil, initially triggered
on the US (subprime) mortgage market, has exemplified that financial market turbu-
lences are not confined only to the developing and emerging economies. Moreover,
the recent tensions have clearly unveiled challenges financial stability authorities
and policy makers have to face in the age of ever deeper and more global markets.
Most importantly, diminishing barriers to capital flows and instant information dis-
tribution increase the potential sudden evasiveness of capital. As evidenced by the
shocking promptness with which the US mortgage malaise extended from one corner
of the financial market to another, crises can spread swiftly between different types
of markets in geographical and technical terms.
One of the most frequent targets of speculators is the currency market and substan-
tial devaluations of the currency under attack generally imply severe consequences
for the respective economy. Against this backdrop it is not surprising that both
in the academic literature and in the private sector a variety of empirical attempts
has been undertaken to predict currency crises. Following the pioneering indica-
1This chapter is based on a joint work with my adviser, Prof. Dr. Jesu´s Crespo-Cuaresma.
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tor approach by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) a whole plethora of early
warning systems for currency crises has been developed. Some of the rather recent
approaches employ innovative methodologies such as Markov switching models (see
e.g. Abiad, 2003 or Chen, 2005) or financial market tools (see e.g. Malz, 2000 or
Crespo-Cuaresma and Slacik, 2007) to predict currency attacks.
The vast majority of the empirical literature assesses the effect of various potential
determinants on the probability of a currency crisis using limited dependent variable
- logit or probit - models. The discrete crisis variable is regressed on a set of fun-
damental indicators, such as, inter alia, current account and government balances,
exchange rate overvaluation or liquidity ratios . The choice of regressors is typically
inspired by the three generations of theoretical models on balance-of-payment crises.
In one of the most recent empirical contributions on this topic Bussie`re (2007) over-
hauls the usually static specification, in which, moreover, all regressors tend to enter
at the same lag. He thus extends the usual set of explanatory variables by including
several lags of the regressors as well as of the dependent binary crisis variable. He
finds that there are several variables significantly affecting the probability of a crisis
in a dynamic logit model. However, the impact of the indicators ranges between
short-run (4-6 months) e.g. for the liquidity measures to very long-run (2 years) in
case of over-appreciation of the exchange rate. In addition, his results indicate that
past crisis episodes increase the probability of a new attack, particularly in the short
run.
Notwithstanding substantial variations in the literature on early warning systems
with respect to methodology, data as well as results, there is one general caveat
which applies to all existing binary choice models. Given that there is no unique
theoretical framework linking the potential set of determinants with the realizations
of currency crises, the issue of model uncertainty surrounding both the choice of
variables and the estimates obtained deserves to be treated seriously. Model uncer-
tainty can be explicitly taken into account using Bayesian statistical techniques, in
particular with the use of the Bayesian model averaging (BMA) methodology which
proposes averaging of the parameter values over all (relevant) alternative models
using posterior model probabilities as respective weights to evaluate the relative
importance of different variables (see Raftery, 1995 for a general discussion and
Sala-i-Martin et alia, 2004, Fernandez et alia, 2001, or Crespo-Cuaresma and Dop-
pelhofer, 2007 for applications to economic growth regressions).
The different theoretical settings used to explain different crises episodes give rise to
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alternative sets of potential explanatory variables (with intersections which are not
necessarily empty) for the probability of a crisis occurring. The so-called first genera-
tion models (Krugman, 1979, Flood and Garber, 1984) concentrate on bad economic
policy leading to unsustainable developments of some fundamental macroeconomic
variables. The abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime is then precipitated
by the eventual exhaustion of the central bank’s foreign reserves. The second gen-
eration of currency crises models (see for instance Obstfeld, 1994), explains crises
as the consequence of self-fulfilling expectations in theoretical settings with multiple
equilibria. In contrast, the third generation of models (Krugman, 1998) explains the
outbreak of a currency run as a symptom of accumulated problems in the banking
and financial sector. In the theoretical setting, government guarantees aimed at
attracting foreign investment lead to a bubble on the asset market that eventually
bursts and creates the crisis. Obviously, given the different theoretical nature of
the ultimate cause of the currency crises in the different generations of models, the
potential empirical determinants to be included in econometric studies vary strongly
depending on the theory used to select covariates.
The objective of the present paper is to revisit binary-variable models for currency
crises based on macroeconomic fundamental data by explicitly taking into account
model uncertainty. In particular, we want to work out to what extent model uncer-
tainty puts the robustness of the explanatory variables of the logit models champi-
oned in the literature (e.g. Bussie`re and Fratzscher 2006 or Bussie`re 2007) under
strain. On the one hand, our results indicate that the usual macroeconomic vari-
ables used in empirical studies of currency crisis are very fragile determinants of the
occurrence of such episodes. On the other hand, if we redefine the crisis indicator as
to give a signal for observations up to one year prior to the crisis, several variables
appear as robust determinants of these crisis periods. Financial market indicators
and the deviations of the real exchange rate from a linear trend present very high
posterior model inclusion probabilities and thus can be considered robust determi-
nants of crisis periods.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 sketches the
Bayesian model averaging procedure. In section 2.3 the data are described and
variables defined. Section 2.4 presents the results on the extent to which model
uncertainty matters, while section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Dealing with model uncertainty: Bayesian model aver-
aging
The binary variable we are interested in modelling takes value one if a currency
crisis occurs in period t (yi = 1) and zero if no currency crisis is observed (yi = 0).
A stereotypical regression aimed at assessing the effect of a set of variables {xj}Kj=1
on the probability of a currency crisis occurring is given by
P(yi = 1|{xj}Kj=1) = F (XKβ), (2.1)
where F (z) will typically be a logistic function (F (z) = (1 + ez)−1) or the distri-
bution function of a normal random variable (F (z) = Φ(z)), XK = (x1 . . . xK),
which is a subset of XK¯ = (x1 . . . xK¯), containing all possible regressors (K¯ > K
of them), and β = (β1 . . . βK)
′. In principle, many candidate variables can be
proposed as potential covariates in (2.1).
So far, the literature tends to concentrate on an arguably tiny subset of this model
space. Model averaging techniques propose averaging over all these alternative mod-
els using Bayes factors so as to evaluate the relative importance of different variables
as determinants of the occurrence of a currency crisis. In the situation where there
are M competing models, {M1, . . . ,MM}, which are defined by the choice of in-
dependent variables, so that M = 2K¯ , Bayesian inference about the parameter of
interest, βi is based on its posterior distribution (that is, the distribution given the
data, Y = {y XK}),
P(βi|Y) =
M∑
m=1
P(βi|Y,Mm)P(Mm|Y), (2.2)
where the posterior probabilities P(Mk|Y) are given by
P(Mk|Y) = P(Y|Mk)P(Mk)∑M
m=1 P(Y|Mm)P(Mm)
. (2.3)
The posterior model probabilities can thus be obtained as the normalized product
of the integrated likelihood for each model (P(Y|Mk)) and the prior probability of
the model (P(Mk)). Notice that for the simple case m = 2 the posterior odds for a
model against the other can be readily written as the product of the Bayes factor
and the prior odds. Further assuming equal priors across models, the posterior odds
are equal to the Bayes factor (P(Y|M2)/P(Y|M1)). The Bayes factor, in turn, can
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be accurately approximated (see Leamer, 1978, and Schwarz, 1978) as
P(Y|M2)
P(Y|M1) = N
(k1−k2)/2
(
Lik2
Lik1
)
, (2.4)
where N is the number of observations, kj and Likj are respectively the number of
parameters and the likelihood of model j. This simple approximation allows us to
compute (2.3) and the corresponding statistics based on (2.3).
This implies that for a given prior on the model space, the posterior distribution of
β can be obtained as a weighted average of the model-specific estimates weighted
by the posterior probability of the respective models. If the cardinality of the model
space is computationally tractable, (2.3) can be obtained directly and (2.2) can be
computed. In particular, the expected value of β and its variance, E(β|Y) and
var(β|Y) respectively, can be computed as follows
E(βi|Y) =
M∑
m=1
E(βi|Y,Mm)P(Mm|Y), (2.5)
var(βi|Y) =
M∑
m=1
[var(βi|Y,Mm) + E(βi|Y,Mm)2]P(Mm|Y)− E(βi|Y)2. (2.6)
The posterior mean and variance can be used to make inference on the quantitative
effect of changes in the covariates on the probability of a currency crisis explicitly
taking into account model uncertainty. Several methods have been proposed for ap-
proximating the expression in (2.3) when the cardinality of the model space makes
the problem intractable. The leaps and bounds algorithm, the use of Markov Chain
Monte Carlo Model Composite (MC3) methods or the use of Occam’s window are
possible methods of setting bounds to the number of models to be evaluated when
computing (2.3) (see Raftery, 1995, for an excellent description of these methods).
In our empirical application we will use a simple MC3 algorithm to evaluate the
posterior distribution based on the work of Madigan and York (1995), also used
recently by Ferna´ndez et alia (2001) in the framework of cross-country growth re-
gressions.2 This Markov Chain Monte Carlo method implements the Random Walk
Chain Metropolis-Hastings algorithm in the model space as follows. In a given repli-
cation s of the algorithm, a candidate model M s+1 is proposed, which is randomly
drawn from the group of models composed by the model which is active in that
2Koop (2003) also describes the method thoroughly.
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replication (M s), the same model with an extra variable added to the specification
and the same model with a variable removed. The proposed model is accepted with
a probability given by
α(M s,M s+1) = min
[
P(Y|M s+1)P(M s+1)
P(Y|M s)P(M s) , 1
]
,
which is just the Bayes factor comparing M s and M s+1 if equal prior probability is
assumed across models, so that P(M s) and P(M s+1) cancel out in the expression
above. This algorithm is repeated a large number of times, and the sums defined
above are computed for the group of models replicated, which will tend to cover
model subspaces with the highest posterior probability.
In the same fashion, posterior inclusion probabilities for the different variables can be
obtained by summing the posterior probability of models containing each variable.
This measure captures, thus, the relative importance of the different covariates as
determinants of the occurrence of a currency crisis and can be interpreted as the
probability that a given variable belongs to the true specification.
2.3 Data and variable descriptions
2.3.1 Data description
The early warning system for currency crises dealt with in this paper is derived
from a binary-variable model based on macroeconomic fundamental data, in the
spirit of the classical contributions by, for instance, Frankel and Rose (1996). Since
currency crises are events which occur seldom, in this type of models it is necessary
to pool country/time data in order to increase the number of observations and ob-
tain sufficient degrees of freedom. Naturally, this procedure implicitly imposes the
assumption of parameter homogeneity across countries and in the time dimension.
The resulting first requirement on our sample thus was that the crises episodes con-
sidered be sufficiently homogeneous, that is, characterized by a similar development
of fundamentals. In addition, however, it was also desirable in this context to employ
the same data source as a recent benchmark study using a ‘standard’ binary-variable
approach (that is, without explicitly dealing with model uncertainty) in order to be
able to figure out the value added by our model averaging procedure.
For these reasons, we decided to use as a yardstick for comparison the dataset of
one of the most recent papers on this issue by Bussie`re (2007), who exercised great
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care in constructing a sample sufficiently homogenous so that common fundamental
development driving the crises may be expected. Against this backdrop the overall
sample consists of a pool of observations on 27 countries recorded from January
1994 to March 2003 and contains approximately 1400 observations3. Observations
prior to 1994 are taken out of the sample to avoid biases emanating from hyperin-
flationary experiences in Latin American countries and the early years of transition
towards a market economy in Eastern European economies.4
The dependent binary variable is defined to equal one if a crisis occurs and zero oth-
erwise. Although in the common understanding a currency crisis might be associated
predominantly with a dramatic devaluation of the exchange rate, the literature on
early-warning mechanisms usually tends to employ a broader definition of currency
distress by using the concept of exchange market pressure. Although the latter is
not uniformly defined in the literature it is usually a weighted average of some com-
bination of the change of the real or nominal exchange rate, the country’s foreign
reserves and the real interest rate. The dependent variable is thus computed in two
steps. First, the exchange market pressure index (EMPIi,t) for country i at time t
is defined as
EMPIi,t = ωRER
(
∆RERi,t
RER
i,t−1
)
+ ωr (∆ri,t)− ωres
(
∆resi,t
resi,t−1
)
,
where RER stands for the real effective exchange rate, r is the short-term real inter-
est rate and res the level of international reserves. In the next bout this continuous
variable is transformed into a binary index which equals one whenever EMPIi,t
exceeds the threshold of the country-specific mean (EMPI i) plus twice its standard
deviation (σEMPIi),
CIi,t =
{
1 if EMPIi,t > EMPI i + 2σEMPIi ,
0 otherwise.
The choice of the explanatory right-hand side variables in (2.1) is motivated by the
theoretical literature on currency crises on the one hand and by the results of the
3The countries included in the sample are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico,
Peru, Venezuela, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Turkey
4Bussie`re and Fratscher (2006) tested for slope homogeneity in a very similar dataset by com-
paring out-of-sample forecasts based on the parameter homogeneity assumption. From the good
forecasting performance they conclude that the same parameter vector is suitable for different
countries and episodes. In contrast, the sample used by Peltonen (2006) which contains also data
on crises from the 1980s suggests significant difference between Latin America and Asia.
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existing empirical early warning models on the other. Table 2.1 lists the complete
final set of variables, different combinations and transformations of which are used
in the estimations below.
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The exchange rate variable is supposed to capture any excessive real overvaluation
of the currency, which would be expected to increase the risk of devaluation. It
is defined as the deviation of the real exchange rate from a linear trend. Since
data on non-performing loans are barely available for under-reporting reasons, the
lending boom indicator is meant to serve as a proxy and is defined as the deviation
of the credit to the private sector (CPSi,t) from a one year average with a two year
lag. The short-term-debt-to-reserves ratio (and analogously the total debt indicator)
reflect the so called Greenspan-Guidotti rule which states that reserves should cover
entirely the amount of external debt that can be sold short-term by investors in case
of an attack. A rise of this indicator can thus stem from either a rise in debt or a fall
of reserves and should render a crisis more likely. The total debt indicator is defined
analogously for two different definitions: the locational (lc) and the consolidated
concept (cc).5 The set of explanatory variables further contains the current account
and government surpluses, both normalized with the respective country’s GDP. The
sign of these two indicators is expected to be negative as the higher the surplus (the
lower the deficit) the lower should be the probability of an attack. Since Bussiere`
and Fratscher (2006) show that contagion across countries is only significant via the
financial and not via the trade channel, only the former was taken into account in
Bussie`re (2007). Financial interlinkages of a country i with all other countries in
the sample are modelled as the average of the other countries’ EMPIj,t (j = 1 to
N − 1, j 6= i) weighted by the correlation of equity market returns in country i
and country j . Intuitively, the parameter attached to this variable should show up
positive in the estimation results. The three subsequent Datastream indices, a broad
market index and two sub-indices on banks and financial institutions, account for the
predictive power of financial markets. They are defined as a 12-months percentage
change of each stock index and are expected to enter with a negative coefficient.
Finally, the year-on-year GDP growth is included as higher economic growth should
reduce the government’s temptation to devalue on its currency, e.g. in order to gain
competitiveness. 6
5The locational banking statistics gather data on international financial claims and liabilities
of bank offices resident in the reporting countries on a gross (unconsolidated) basis, including
those vis-a`-vis own affiliates. In contrast, the consolidated concept covers claims reported by
domestic bank head offices, including the exposures of their foreign affiliates, and are collected on
a worldwide consolidated basis with inter-office positions being netted out. For details see Bank
for International Settlements (2003).
6Further details on the construction of the variables and the intuition behind their choice can
be found in Bussie`re (2007)
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2.4 Empirical results: How much does model uncertainty
matter?
2.4.1 Results for the “crisis occurrence” indicator
Following Bussie`re (2007), we present results based on three types of specification.
Firstly, we deal with a purely static model, where lags of the dependent variable do
not appear as extra regressors in the model, although all explanatory variables are
evaluated with one month lag with respect to the crisis variable. We then address
dynamic models, which on top of the exogenous set of variables employed in the
static model also include up to six lags of the crisis index as explanatory variables.
Finally, the most general specification includes up to 24 lags of six selected variables
(REERDEV,LB, STDR, CA
GDP
, CONT,GROWTH).7
In Table 2.2 we report the results of the BMA exercise for the static case, where all
specifications in the model space have been evaluated in order to compute posterior
inclusion probabilities and posterior expected values of the parameters.8 We also
deal explicitly with the issue of potential multicollinearity among the regressors.
The first two columns of the table show the posterior expected values of the pa-
rameters corresponding to each variable (first column) and the posterior inclusion
probabilities (second column) for the BMA exercise using all variables in Table 2.1.
Under the header Static uncorrelated the results are presented for the BMA exercise
after taking out variables whose correlation with some other explanatory variable
was equal to or greater than 0.5 (both total debt indicators and one of the Datas-
tream indices are the variables which do not enter this exercise).
7Bussie`re (2007) also estimates models with fixed effects and reports that the hypothesis that
all country fixed effects are equal to zero can be rejected, but admits that the p-value of the test
is close to 10%. Conditional logit models are also estimated by Bussie`re (2007) for both the static
and the dynamic model, with results which are very close to those from the model where no fixed
effects were used.
8In order to keep the table readable, we do not report the posterior variances of the parameters,
which are available from the authors upon request.
47
V
a
ri
a
b
le
S
ta
ti
c
S
ta
ti
c
u
n
co
rr
e
la
te
d
B
u
ss
ie`
re
(2
0
0
7
)
st
a
ti
c
E
(β
i|Y
)
In
c.
P
ro
b
.
E
(β
i|Y
)
In
c.
P
ro
b
.
S
im
p
le
st
at
ic
F
ix
ed
eff
ec
ts
E
x
ch
an
ge
ra
te
,
d
ev
.
fr
om
tr
en
d
0.
00
76
58
0.
00
12
85
0.
02
12
11
0.
00
14
45
[0
.0
25
;0
.0
42
]
[0
.0
32
;0
.0
45
]
L
en
d
in
g
b
o
om
0.
00
41
09
0.
00
25
81
0.
00
88
54
0.
00
23
12
[0
.0
06
]
[0
.0
05
;0
06
]
S
h
or
t-
te
rm
d
eb
t/
re
se
rv
es
0.
00
04
56
0.
00
13
35
0.
00
09
76
0.
00
12
78
[0
.0
03
;0
.0
04
]
[0
.0
07
;0
.0
09
]
T
ot
al
d
eb
t/
re
se
rv
es
(l
c)
0.
00
02
52
0.
00
12
66
[0
.0
02
]
[0
.0
04
]
T
ot
al
d
eb
t/
re
se
rv
es
(c
c)
0.
00
03
33
0.
00
17
01
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
06
]
C
u
rr
en
t
ac
co
u
n
t
b
al
an
ce
−0
.0
12
99
7
0.
00
14
34
−0
.0
32
72
5
0.
00
14
73
n
.s
.
[−
0.
14
1;
−0
.0
77
]
G
ov
n
er
n
m
en
t
b
al
an
ce
0.
02
04
14
0.
00
09
47
0.
04
85
60
0.
00
09
45
[0
.0
82
]
n
.s
.
F
in
an
ci
al
co
n
ta
gi
on
0.
02
38
83
0.
01
16
78
0.
05
19
47
0.
00
97
97
[0
.0
43
]
[−
0.
01
5;
0.
04
3]
D
at
as
tr
ea
m
in
d
ex
,
to
ta
l
m
ar
ke
t
−0
.0
02
98
6
0.
00
80
47
−0
.0
12
90
7
0.
03
31
48
n
.s
.
[−
0.
00
8]
D
at
as
tr
ea
m
in
d
ex
,
b
an
k
s
−0
.0
03
20
6
0.
02
31
55
n
.s
.
[−
0.
01
4]
D
at
as
tr
ea
m
in
d
ex
,
fi
n
an
ci
al
in
st
it
u
ti
on
s
−0
.0
03
41
4
0.
02
95
42
−0
.0
11
91
3
0.
09
50
18
n
.s
.
[−
0.
01
5]
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
−0
.0
07
17
9
0.
00
08
46
−0
.0
14
04
5
0.
00
08
38
[−
0.
05
2]
n
.s
.
T
ab
le
2.
2:
B
M
A
re
su
lt
s:
S
ta
ti
c
m
o
d
el
These posterior expected values of the parameters can be compared with the results
reported in Bussie`re (2007), which are shown in the fifth column for the simple static
model and in column six for the static model with fixed effects. Since Bussie`re alter-
nates the set of included variables to avoid multicollinearity we report here the range
in which his (significant) estimates fall (n.s. stands for non-significant, if no estimate
on at least the 10%-level was available). Two facts call attention when considering
the results in Table 2.2. First of all, the posterior expected parameter values have
mostly the expected sign. The probability of a crisis thus tends to increase with the
lending boom, debts relative to reserves, the contagion indicator and the deviation
of the exchange rate from its trend. In contrast, robust growth and rising market
indices and current account surpluses reduce the risk of a currency attack. The only
somewhat counter-intuitive result, consistently confirmed in all estimations, is the
positive sign of the government balance variable.9
However, the lack of robustness of the relationships under study shows up when con-
sidering the posterior inclusion probabilities reported in Table 2.2. Since we assign
equal prior probability to all models when computing the posterior model averaged
objects, our prior on the inclusion probability of each variable is 0.5.10 After ob-
serving the data, the probabilities of including each variable decreases strongly with
respect to the prior, with none of the posterior probabilities being higher than 10%.
To put it differently, the model with the greatest posterior probability (in fact one
that is very close to 1) implies a constant crisis probability which is not country or
time-specific (that is, the model including only a constant).
Table 2.3 is constructed in the same manner as Table 2.2 for the case of the dy-
namic model, including lags of the dependent variable. With the exception of the
government balance variable, all variables show up again with the expected signs
which coincide with those obtained by the benchmark study, when they are signif-
icant. However, except for the market indices, this time our coefficients appear to
be substantially smaller in magnitude than Bussie`re’s (2007). The posterior inclu-
sion probabilities are once more well below the 0.5 threshold. In other words, the
inclusion of six de-facto new variables does not lead to any improvement of the ex-
9However, it should be borne in mind that the sample for all estimations starts in 1994, and
it is a well known fact that first generation models generally fail to explain crises in the 1990s.
Second and third generation models might actually get some support by this somewhat surprising
result (see for example Krugman, 1996 and Bussie`re, 2007).
10There are 2K¯−1 models including a given variable and 2K¯ total models, so the prior inclusion
probability of a given variable is 2K¯−1/2K¯=0.5.
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planatory power of macroeconomic fundamentals. Bussie`re finds that the dependent
variable is significant only at lag 5 and 6 in both models, with and without fixed ef-
fects. The interpretation of this result is that crises sometimes hit in two waves such
that the first attack is often followed by a second bout within a short time distance.
In this context, it is also interesting to note that all the coefficients of the lagged
crisis index in our and Bussie`re’s regressions enter with a positive sign. Hence, past
crises tend to increase the likelihood of repeated attacks, a result which is not quite
obvious ex-ante. On the one hand, a country that has experienced a crisis may be
deemed more vulnerable by investors which would speak for a positive sign. On the
other hand, however, two arguments can be proposed why crises in the past might
reduce the probability of an attack in the future. In the short run, after a currency
run there is not much speculative capital left to be withdrawn. Moreover, in the
longer run, one can argue that the country previously hit has improved its vigilance
and supervision mechanisms which should render a repeated crisis less likely.
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In order to account for a general dynamic structure in the model, Bussie`re (2007) re-
gresses in a standard logit model (without fixed effects) the dependent variable on six
chosen explanatory variables (REERDEV,LB, STDR, CA
GDP
, CONT,GROWTH)
which are all lagged by 1 to 24 months. This series of regressions thus provides
him with 24 different models and 144 different coefficients from which the author
draws the conclusion that “some variables have a very short-term impact, such as
the short-term debt to reserve ratio, some have both a very short-term and a longer
term impact (such as the contagion variable), some have a short- to medium-term
impact (such as the lending boom), some always seem to have an impact (such as
the exchange rate), while for growth and the current account, no impact can be de-
tected” (Bussie`re, 2007, page 26). We conducted a different exercise at this point
and constructed the BMA procedure using as explanatory variables six lags of the
crisis variable and 24 lags of all 12 variables listed in Table 2.1, all at the same
time. Hence, this setting contains 294 potential explanatory variables which imply
2294 (more than 3 × 1088) different models over which we have to average. Given
the fact that, with the current technology, this does not appear possible in a life-
time11, we used the MC3 approach described above to evaluate the posterior objects.
In table 2.4 we confine ourselves to reporting only the results for the lags of each
variable with the highest posterior inclusion probability.12 Focusing on the coeffi-
cients in the second column one can note that some of the signs now have changed
into an unexpected direction. The government surplus, which used to carry a coun-
terintuitive positive coefficient now has got the “right”, negative sign, while more
robust growth, higher current account surpluses and lower lending suddenly and
counter-intuitively increase the probability of a crisis - at least for the lags with the
highest inclusion probability. As if this was not puzzling enough, the sign of the
coefficients is not uniform for all lags but rather alternates from positive to nega-
tive for all variables. Interestingly enough, the fluctuation pattern looks to a great
extent similar to the one derived by Bussie`re (2007). In his estimations growth, for
instance, only has the expected negative sign for lags 1 to 8 and 16 to 19. Similarly,
current account surpluses lagged by more than 11 months increase the probability
of a crises. The latter is also more likely the lower was the lending boom 18 months
11If it took only 0.001 second to estimate one model the whole calculation would last 1.009 ×1078
years. Although the reasoning put forward above could also imply that interactions between long
and short-term variables play an important role in unwinding currency crises, due to the extra
computational burden imposed by the use of cross-products, we do not embark in this type of
exercise in the present study.
12The complete set of results is available from the authors.
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Figure 2.1: Estimated parameters at different lag lengths for selected variables
or more ago. It has to be added, however, that growth, current account and the
lending boom from lag 13 on are not significant (see Figure 2.1, which presents some
of the parameters estimated by BMA against Bussie`re’s results).
Among the remaining variables which carry the same sign as in the previous calcu-
lations (for the lag with the highest posterior inclusion probability at least) it strikes
that the effect of the lagged crisis binary variable is again the most robust at lag
5. In addition, the effect of the exchange rate deviation from trend is now almost
twenty times bigger than in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. This is because the coefficient of the
exchange rate variable shows a strong bell-shaped form, rising strongly between lags
4 and 10 and decreasing sharply after that. This contradicts somewhat Bussie`re’s
Variable E(βi|Y) Max. inc. prob. at lag
Crisis index 0.47073 2.08× 10−5 5
Current account balance 0.023066 3.18× 10−5 24
Govnernment balance −0.017251 1.30× 10−5 18
Growth rate 0.008615 1.69× 10−5 5
Lending boom −0.000927 1.02× 10−5 13
Financial contagion 0.035614 9.55× 10−5 5
Datastream index, banks −0.005556 4.22× 10−5 24
Datastream index, financial institutions −0.005589 6.07× 10−5 24
Datastream index, total market −0.010482 0.000154 24
Exchange rate, dev. from trend 0.129465 0.894149 10
Short-term debt/reserves 0.00066 1.98× 10−5 7
Total debt/reserves (cc) 0.000435 3.53× 10−5 23
Total debt/reserves (lc) 0.000183 1.93× 10−5 22
Table 2.4: BMA results: Dynamic model with lagged explanatory variables
results according to which the exchange rate effect seems much more homogenous
and significant for all lags. Lastly, it may also be pointed out that all market signals
seem to be most symptomatic of tension on the exchange rate market 2 years in
advance, which is not quite easy to interpret either.
As can be seen in the third column of Table 2.4 which displays the lag with the
maximum posterior inclusion probability for each variable all values but one are far
beyond good and evil. Only the deviation of the exchange rate from trend at lag
10 shows up with a posterior inclusion probability above the prior of 0.5. Although
the importance of the variable is clear, by no stretch of imagination we can think of
any plausible explanation for the fact that only the tenth lag appears robust, and
even less so if considering the fact that the second highest inclusion probability for
this variable (at lag 9) is more than ten times smaller. We thus argue that it is just
a matter of coincidence and that also in this exercise fundamentals have proven to
have no systematic and robust explanatory power for currency crises.
2.4.2 Results for the “crisis period” indicator
The results presented above are based on a crisis index which indicates a crisis
in a particular month if the continuous exchange market pressure index exceeds a
certain threshold in that month. In other words, a model based on this definition
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of a crisis attempts to predict the exact timing of a crisis in a given country. As
we have shown, if we employ this crisis definition and address model uncertainty
in a Bayesian manner we, unlike Bussie`re (2007), find virtually no robustness of
the potential explanatory variables. The model-based results by Bussie`re (2007),
however, do not perform too well in terms of prediction. It is argued in Bussie`re
(2007) that, by trying to predict the exact month of a crisis, the model attempts
to achieve something that may simply be infeasible. In order to address this caveat
the time window of the crisis definition is extended to a whole year. Hence, a crisis
signal is now issued not only if a strong depreciation occurs within a month but if the
EMPI exceeds the threshold in any of the successive 12 months. The corresponding
(transformed) crisis indicator (TCI) is thus
TCIi,t =
{
1 if ∃k ∈ 1, . . . , 12 | CIi,t+k = 1,
0 otherwise.
If the reason for the middling explanatory power in our results is the narrow defini-
tion of a crisis and the difficulty of predicting the exact timing of such episodes, then
this broader definition should improve the inclusion probabilities of our explanatory
variables. It should be noticed that in this case we are giving more relevance to the
explanatory power for differences between countries, as opposed to within countries.
Analogously to our exercise for the original index, we estimate models within static
and a dynamic specification classes using now this transformed crisis index.13 The
results are presented in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. For comparison we again report the
intervals of significant parameter values obtained by Bussie`re (2007).14
13Note that the extension of the time window implies a certain information loss. In the dynamic
panel in this new setting the dependent variable thus has to be lagged by 12 months.
14Note that the comparability is limited in the dynamic setting since we, unlike Bussie`re, include
the stock indices in this specification.
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Most of the inclusion probabilities remain well below the prior threshold of 0.5.
However, it strikes that in both static regressions the inclusion probabilities have
improved dramatically for the real effective exchange rate deviation from a linear
trend and for the financial contagion variable. Both variables now have a posterior
inclusion probability close to one. Moreover, they both have the expected sign and
in terms of magnitude come very close to the parameters obtained by Bussie`re. The
same holds true also in the dynamic setting, where, in addition, also the included
Datastream stock index (institutions) shows substantial explanatory abilities.
These results suggest that, while the exact timing of a crisis may indeed be un-
predictable, differences in macroeconomic and financial variables still contain in-
formation about differential degrees of currency crisis exposure. Moreover, for the
probability of a “crisis period” merely two groups of variables seem to matter: the
deviation of the real exchange rate from trend on the one hand, and financial market
indicators on the other. These results enforce the hypothesis that each currency cri-
sis is eventually triggered by the behavioral change of financial market participants,
who seem to care to some extent about a handful of macroeconomic variables and
to a great extent about the (herding) behaviour of their colleagues.
2.5 Summary and conclusions
The dominant majority of early warning mechanisms for currency crises employs
some version of fundamental-based binary choice models. To our knowledge, none
of the papers on the subject tackles the issue of model uncertainty in currency crisis
model explicitly. In the present paper we have explicitly taken into account model
uncertainty in the framework of a binary choice model. By means of Bayesian model
averaging we estimate the coefficients for each variable as weighted averages over
the alternative models from the model space, where the weights correspond to the
posterior probability of each model. In order to figure out the value added by this
approach as opposed to “standard” logit regressions we have used the same data set
as one of the most recent studies on the subject by Bussie`re (2007).
If the discrete dependent variable is constructed so as to predict the exact month in
which a crisis may happen our conclusions are twofold. On the one hand, we have
found that coefficients mostly have the expected signs coinciding with the bench-
mark study. On the other hand, however, our principal quality gauge, the posterior
inclusion probability (the sum of posterior probabilities of all models containing a
particular variable), unveils the lacking robustness of the relationships between re-
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gressors and the dependent variable. These results imply that at least in this setting
the best model to explain a currency crisis is a mere time and country-unspecific
constant. Our results, therefore, indicate that none of the usual macroeconomic
fundamental variables is a robust determinant of a currency crisis for the definition
and sample used. The results improve considerably if we consider defining “crisis
periods” instead of crisis occurrences. Defining crisis periods as observations up to
one year prior to the crisis, we find that real exchange rate developments and finan-
cial variables are able to robustly explain differences in the probability of a country
experiencing such episodes.
Since our sample starts in 1994 it could well be that episodes of currency distress
included in the sample are crises rather of the second and third generation type.
In such a case it would not be surprising that fundamental data show only limited
explanatory power. To turn the argument around, the fundamentals should play a
much more significant role in a sample covering the first generation type of crises.
Exactly along these paths we are planning to conduct our future research.
A finer way of testing the different theoretical frameworks proposed by the three
generations of currency crises models would imply grouping variables by theory and
computing the joint inclusion probability of these groups of variables. The con-
struction of groups of variables by theory could be handled in the BMA framework
using the proposal by Brock, Durlauf and West (2003) of using a hierarchical prior
in order to sort variables into theories or thematic indicators (see also the recent
contribution by Doppelhofer and Weeks, 2007, for the concept of jointness of deter-
minants in the BMA framework). Although we did not follow this approach in the
paper, we propose it as a potentially fruitful path of further research.
An interesting issue that has not been directly tackled in the paper and that would
deserve further scrutiny is the possibility of nonlinear effects in form of interactions
among the potential determinants of crises. Developments in some relevant variables
may just be responsible for preparing the ground for imbalances that end up a
currency crisis when triggered by an unsound development in an additional variable.
The use of interaction terms in a BMA setting could assess the importance of this
type of effects.
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Chapter 3
(How) Will the Euro Affect
Inflation in the Czech Republic?
3.1 Introduction
A lot has been said about the costs and benefits of monetary unions in general and
about the common European currency in particular. One of the disadvantages of
euro adoption typically most feared by the general public is a sizable rise of the price
level. According to the Eurobarometer survey from November 2007, 74 % of citizens
in the EU - New Member States (NMS)1 agree with the statement that the euro will
increase prices (see Eurobarometer 2007). An important role in forming inflation
expectations related to the introduction of the euro is played by media as well as
influential and trustworthy institutions and politicians. Inflation expectations, on
their part, might have a substantial impact on future actual inflation rates. There-
fore, in the discussion on the possible inflationary impact of the common currency
it is essential to provide the public with balanced, understandable and transparent
arguments. Using the case study of the Czech Republic the objective of the present
paper is thus to put the discussion on a firm footing by analysing in a qualitative and
quantitative manner the channels through which the euro adoption might have an
effect on inflation embedded in a framework of other cyclical, structural and external
inflation factors. The fact that the Czech Republic does not have an official target
date after the originally envisaged horizon of 2010 has been postponed does not
preclude an intense and partially very prominent discussion on pros and cons of the
euro that primarily centres around the expected inflationary impact. In contrast,
1By NMS we mean the following countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania.
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the presumably relatively long run-up period to the euro allows a thorough and
conscientious preparation in which use can be made of the experience and expertise
of the current Eurozone countries. A profound discussion is certainly a substantial
part of this process.
Joining a monetary union might not only bring about a discrete change in infla-
tion expectations. In the first place it implies the abandonment of an autonomous
monetary and exchange rate policy, two important adjustment channels. It is nat-
ural to conjecture that the interest rate set for a union consisting of not entirely
homogeneous economies might deviate from the interest rate that would be conve-
nient for a single country, with all consequences for inflation. In order to analyse
this issue econometrically we estimate as a side-product the time-varying real nat-
ural interest rate by means of an unobserved components model based on Harvey
(1989). Horva´th (2007) is to our best knowledge the only study so far to estimate
the (nominal) natural interest rate for the Czech Republic using various specifica-
tions of Taylor-type rules and our results can thus provide a useful comparison. In
addition, however, in the spirit of Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004) we also estimate
the natural rate of interest purged from the risk premia which is probably the first
attempt to do so for the Czech Republic.
Notwithstanding the abandonment of monetary autonomy, the most conventional
argument put forward in the discussion on inflationary impacts of the euro centres
around the substantial price level gap with respect to the Eurozone which is char-
acteristic for a catching-up economy as the Czech Republic. Price level convergence
is carried out via nominal exchange rate appreciation on the one hand, and a posi-
tive inflation differential relative to the Eurozone on the other. It is usually argued
that the latter is driven by typical transition phenomena such as lower productivity
growth in the non-tradable sector relative to the tradable sector (e.g. Holman 2006)
or gradual shifts to higher quality goods (Bruha and Podpiera 2007). These authors
conclude that if the nominal appreciation channel is closed after fixing the exchange
rate to the euro inflation will inevitably have to accelerate in order to keep the pace
of real appreciation. We will have a close look at this line of argument but we do
not quite share this opinion and believe that the size of the possible inflation rise
ascribable to the lack of nominal appreciation will depend essentially on the extent
with which exchange rate movements are passed through onto consumer prices. If
this exchange rate pass-through is strong then the nominal appreciation has a sig-
nificant dampening effect on inflation thus rendering a peg more costly.
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On January 1, 2007 Slovenia joined as the first NMS the European Monetary Union
and was thus also the first country to introduce the euro as book money and cash
on the same date. Hence, barring the effects related to abandonment of autonomous
monetary policy we also have to investigate whether the changeover of coins and
notes can have some impact on inflation. Though this should be in theory a mere
nominal event it turns out that there are several luring risks for the changeover to
be taken advantage of. However, we will also argue that even though these risks can
probably not be eliminated altogether they might be substantially reduced as the
experience of some current Eurozone members suggests.
After a qualitative discussion we test the relative importance of those inflation chan-
nels through which the euro might strike along with other relevant cyclical, external
and structural inflation factors based on E´gert (2007a,b) in an autoregressive dis-
tributed lag (ARDL) model. Since standard model selection criteria do not lead to
consistent results, in line with the recommendations made by Yang (2004) we com-
bine all models under a proper weighting scheme by employing the Bayesian Model
Averaging technique. In order to reduce the intractably large model space we use
the Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model Composite algorithm. The results suggest
that a harmonization of the business cycle with the Eurozone and a low inflation en-
vironment are essential for a smooth inflation path. However, the latter should not
be enforced by non-standard measures such as withholding necessary adjustments
of regulated prices. In contrast, consistently with the existing literature we do not
find much evidence either for the Balassa-Samuelson-effect or a strong exchange rate
pass-through.
This chapter is structured as follows. The following section provides some stylized
facts on the inflation development of the first-wave Eurozone countries and the three
countries that have opted out. Against this backdrop section 3.3 seeks to identify
and flesh out those relevant inflation forces that are likely to be affected in the
wake of the euro adoption via both the common monetary policy as well as the
cash changeover. Anticipating the subsequent econometric test we also describe the
operationalization of these channels for the empirical estimation and the data. In
section 3.4 we explain the method, describe the remaining variables included in the
model and sketch out the results. The last section wraps up and derives interesting
policy conclusions.
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3.2 Stylized facts
Before we delve into the channels through which the euro might affect inflation in
the Czech Republic it is helpful to have a brief look at some stylized facts regarding
the European economic and monetary unification process and its effects on infla-
tion. In June 1988 the European Council approved the objective of establishing an
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The necessary revision of the legal frame-
work was provided in the Treaty on European Union (Treaty) which was signed in
Maastricht in February 1992 and came into force on November 1, 1993. The actual
birth of the EMU in the sense of a single monetary policy under the responsibility of
one European Central Bank (ECB) dates back to January 1, 1999. On that day the
third and final stage of the economic and monetary unification process was launched
with the irrevocable fixing of the exchange rates of the currencies of the 11 initially
participating Member States (henceforth also referred to as EU-11) and the euro
thus became their legal tender.2 Greece joined the club on January 1, 2001.3 One
year later, on January 1 2002, euro coins and banknotes were put into circulation
and thus replaced the 12 national currencies which had, since 1999, represented only
different denominations of the single currency.4 Except for Denmark and the United
Kingdom which negotiated an opt-out the Treaty obliges all current and future EU
members to adopt the euro as their legal tender after meeting the so called Conver-
gence (or Maastricht) criteria. Besides the criterion on price stability, government
finances and long-term interest rates each euro-candidate must have participated in
the new exchange-rate mechanism (ERM II) for at least two years preceding the
examination of the situation without any break and without severe tensions.5 To
this end, Sweden as the only ’old’ EU member without an opt-out from the Treaty
has not yet introduced the euro as it has not met the exchange rate criterion. In
contrast, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus have been as of today the only NMS to extend
the Eurozone.
Hence, if we want to collect some stylized facts on the inflation impact of the euro
in the 12 initial countries we have to make a clear distinction between the period
following the launch of the common currency and monetary policy on January 1,
1999 (and January 1, 2001 in case of Greece, respectively) on the one hand, and the
period after January 1, 2002 on which date the cash changeover took place on the
2Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal,
Finland
3The initial 11 EMU countries and Greece will be referred to as EU-12.
4For details on the history of the Economic and Monetary Union see e.g. www.ecb.eu.
5See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html
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other. In case of countries that joined or will join the Eurozone later both effects,
the one brought about by the abandonment of monetary policy autonomy and the
one caused by the currency changeover, fall together. Moreover, for reasons that will
be addressed in more detail below, the combination of these two effects might turn
out relatively even more pronounced if compared to the preceding run-up period.
After a visual inspection of Figure 3.1 depicting inflation paths for EU-11 it strikes
that in most countries inflation6 eased somewhat or remained broadly stable in the
year following the realisation of EMU. In 2000 the cycle reached a turning point
and inflation rose until it peaked in the course of 2001 followed by a slowdown, dif-
ferently pronounced in the respective countries. Also the subsequent path suggests
a recognizable cyclical pattern up until 2007 similar in most EU-11 countries. The
average inflation rate in the Eurozone rose from 1.5% in the two years preceding
the EMU creation to 1.9% between 1999 and 2006. In contrast, if we compare the
same periods in two EU but non-Eurozone countries, Sweden and the UK, inflation
remained stable in the former at 1.5% and declined from 1.7% to 1.1% in the lat-
ter. Thus, these numbers might evoke the hypothesis that in general the common
monetary policy has led to inflation acceleration. Such a conclusion, however, would
be premature. Figure 3.2 displays three panels in which the inflation cycle in three
non-euro EU countries, Denmark, Sweden and the UK is drawn against the inflation
paths in an appropriate EMU-counterpart, with some lag if needed. In most EU-11
countries the inflation cycle happened to head downwards to its local minimum prior
to 1999 and made a U-turn after that. Therefore it is not surprising that inflation
appears to have accelerated in the wake of a common monetary policy. However, as
can be seen in the first panel of Figure 3.2 the inflation paths in Denmark matched
the one in Finland very closely. Correspondingly, very similar to the Eurozone per-
formance the average inflation in Denmark thus rose from 1.6% in 1997-1998 to 2%
between 1999 and 2006. In Sweden and the UK where the cycle appears to be lagged
by some 6 and 14 months (second and third panel of Figure 3.2), respectively, the
downward paths to the local minimum corresponds to the period 1997-1999 in case
of Sweden and 1997-2000 for the UK. If we compare the average inflation in these
two respective periods to the average inflation in the second half of the sample we
find that price increases accelerated by 0.5 percentage points in Sweden and 0.2
percentage points in Britain.
Concerning the inflationary effect of the euro changeover in January 2002 a sim-
ple eyeballing Figure 3.1 suggests what has been concluded by several studies after
6Measured by a 12-month-moving average of the y-o-y change of the HICP.
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Figure 3.1: HICP (12-month moving average of the y-o-y change) and perceived
inflation in the EU-11
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a much more sophisticated and comprehensive analysis7: Excessive price increases
about which the public had been concerned prior to the introduction of euro coins
and notes8 did not occur. Even though there was a slight inflation acceleration in
some countries and also in the EU-12 as a whole in the first three months of 2002
(light grey window), the impact was transitory and in most countries price increases
slowed down again within a couple of weeks (dark grey window). Hence, on bal-
ance, there is no evidence underpinning the notion that the euro changeover had
a remarkable impact on the overall consumer price inflation. Moreover, as Hobijn
et al. (2004) note, the inflation experience in the initial 12 EMU countries was
not very different from that in Denmark, Sweden, and Britain. However, while the
European Commission estimates that the changeover impact on the overall HICP
inflation ranged between 0.12 and 0.29 percentage points in 20029 there were signif-
icant and persistent price increases in some specific industries, particularly services
such as restaurants, cafes and hairdressers.10 Therefore, while the average annual-
ized monthly inflation rate in the EU-12 restaurant and cafe sector over the period
January 1995 through March 2004 was 2.8%, in January 2002 inflation in that sector
went up to 15.6% (see Hobijn et al. 2004).
In parallel to the debate on the impact of the EMU on inflation the euro gave rise to
an unprecedented break in the consumers’ perception of price increases that sharply
contradicts actual inflation figures. This can be seen in Figure 3.1 which displays
apart from the HICP also the so called balance statistic of the inflation perception
survey carried out among consumers by the European Commission on a monthly
basis. The balance statistic is calculated as the difference between a weighted pro-
portion of respondents stating that prices have risen and those stating that prices
have fallen or stayed about the same.11 The distance between the two curves in
Figure 3.1 thus measures the size of the perception gap. While in most countries in-
flation perception followed the actual inflation rather closely prior to the changeover
in January 2002 the gap widened substantially immediately thereafter and continued
7See e.g. Deutsche Bundesbank (2004), Eife (2006) or Hobijn et al. (2004).
8See Commission of the European Communities (2001).
9The effect was probably largest in the Netherlands, 0.6 percentage points (see Folkertsma et
al. 2002) and in Italy, 0.5 percentage points (Aucremanne et al. 2007).
10See http://ec.europa.eu/economy finance/euro/faqs/faqs 16 en.htm
11There are six possible answers to the question: ”How do you think that consumer prices
have developed over the last 12 months?”. A(1) ”risen a lot”; A(2) ”risen moderately”; A(3)
”risen slightly”; A(4) ”stayed about the same”; A(5) ”fallen” and A(6) ”do not know”. The
balance statistic is thus computed as: Bit = Ait(1) + 0.5Ait(2) − 0.5Ait(4) − Ait(5) (See:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy finance/indicators/businessandconsumersurveys en.htm)
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to grow until early 2003. Then it either remained stable or shrank until end 2006
and seems to have been broadening again since. Aucremanne et al (2007) confirm
the anecdotal evidence by showing that this gap is econometrically significant and
that there was no such break in the inflation perception in 2002 in the control panel
of those three countries that have opted out of the Monetary Union so far.
We can conclude this section by looking at the data from Slovenia which is often
cited as the obvious evidence for the inflationary impact of the euro. Although
prices actually went down in Slovenia m-o-m in January and February 2007 the y-o-
y inflation rate, indeed, accelerated over the course of 2007 and amounted to 5.7%
in December 2007. However, the popular view to blame the euro for this pick-up is
questioned if we contrast the inflation development in Slovenia with the one in the
Czech Republic. As can be seen in Figure 3.3, inflation rates in the Czech Republic
and Slovenia have co-moved virtually over the entire sample period. While the level
gap widened somewhat in 1999 and reached its maximum in 2003 since 2004 the
gap has become infinitesimally narrow with a correlation 0.8 between the two series.
Since the euro introduction in Slovenia in January 2007 the correlation amounted
to as much as 0.94 as the inflation rate in the Czech Republic also rose over the
course of 2007 and reached 5.5% in December. In fact, according to the study by
Deloitte Consulting (2007) there was only a slight acceleration of inflation in Slovenia
attributable to the euro introduction amounting to mere 0.3 percentage points or
less. Hence, the rise of the inflation rate must have been primarily fuelled by other
determinants such as the economic overheating and external factors such as oil and
food prices. Particularly the latter have increased by twice as much as in other
EU countries due to, as anecdotal evidence suggests, insufficient competition in the
retail market (see Bank of Slovenia 2007 and e.g. Eurobusiness 2007). This latest
experimental evidence thus appears to corroborate previous experience: while the
actual impact of the euro on inflation seems to have been rather moderate, inflation
perception literally skyrocketed in parallel and the gap between actual and perceived
inflation has reached exceptional levels.
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Figure 3.3: HICP (y-o-y change) in the Czech Republic and Slovenia
3.3 Factors through which euro adoption might impact in-
flation
3.3.1 Long-term factors
3.3.1.1 Price level convergence and nominal appreciation
The usual argument put forward for why the euro adoption is expected to increase
inflation goes approximately like this: The relative price level in the euro candidate
country is substantially lower than in the EMU. Therefore, there is a high potential
for price catch-up both in the tradable and non-tradable sector. While in the former
price convergence is driven for instance by a gradual shift to higher-quality-goods
that are typically more expansive (Bruha and Podpiera 2007), in the non-tradable
sector it is particularly the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) effect.12 At the same time the
respective transition economy is often characterized by a trend nominal appreciation
of its currency which in combination with the price catch-up process brings about
a significant appreciation of the equilibrium real exchange rate. However, if the
nominal appreciation is no longer possible after the euro adoption it follows that the
real exchange rate appreciation will take place completely via the relative inflation
12For a recent formal discussion of the Balassa-Samuelson effect see e.g. E´gert (2007).
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channel as it is the only one remaining. To put it with Suster et al. (2006):
In the long run it can be expected that after joining the euro area the inflation in Slo-
vakia will be higher than inflation in the euro area by a margin which will be about
equal to appreciation rate of the equilibrium real exchange rate of koruna against
euro. (...) If the current annual appreciation rate of the equilibrium real exchange
rate of koruna was maintained at the level of approximately 2-3% also after entry
to the euro area, the inflation in Slovakia could be in a short run higher than in the
rest of the euro area by such a difference.
Concerning the Czech Republic, Holman (2006), a Board Member of the Czech Na-
tional Bank (CNB), estimated that if the Czech Republic had adopted the euro back
then annual inflation would have hovered around 6% after rising by about 3 percent-
age points which corresponds to the average annual appreciation of the koruna.13
Mach (2003) goes even a dimension further and predicts that inflation will return
to annual 10% from the first half of the 1990s.14
If our reading of this argument sequence is correct, it makes two implicit assump-
tions. Firstly, it seems that a perfect pass-through of nominal exchange rate appre-
ciation on consumer prices is assumed so that a x% nominal appreciation dampens
the inflation rate by x percentage points. Secondly, this line of argument evokes the
notion that in the equation ∆er = ∆e + (pi − pi∗) where ∆e is the annual change
of the nominal exchange rate defined as euro per unit of domestic currency and
(pi − pi∗) stands for the annual inflation differential between the home country and
the Eurozone, the path of the real exchange rate er on the left hand side is somehow
exogenously determined and can only be pushed through either of the two chan-
nels on the right hand side. In other words, the argument assumes that price level
convergence (e p
p∗ , where e is the exchange rate (euro per unit of domestic currency)
and p and p∗ the price level in, respectively, the home country and the Eurozone)
is not the result of the transition process but the driving mechanism per se. In our
opinion, however, this sequence of arguments puts the cart before the horse and it
is worth to think about it in more detail.
Certainly there is enough scope for price level convergence in the transition EU
13This estimate was published in June 2006 after the annual inflation rate (measured by the
CPI, the target index of the CNB) had reached 1.9% in 2005 and averaged 2.9% between January
and May 2006.
14For a slightly different perspective of the same issue see Bruha and Podpiera (2007).
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economies both in the tradable and the non-tradable sector. In the Czech Republic
the price level of total goods reached nearly 74% of the EMU level in 2006, while the
price level in services amounted to mere 42% of the Eurozone.15 Apparently, price
level convergence can only materialize through nominal exchange rate appreciation
or a faster rise of the price level in the transition economy relative to the Eurozone.
If one of the channels is abandoned in the wake of the euro adoption, the speed of
price level convergence thus will be determined by definition solely by the relative
inflation. Unlike the cited authors, however, we do not see the mechanism due to
which price level convergence necessarily needs to keep the pace determined prior
to the euro adoption and has thus be inevitably reflected in higher inflation rates
after fixing the exchange rate.
Despite the theoretical concept of the law of one price an abundant empirical liter-
ature has confirmed that price levels significantly differ across the EU and converge
rather sluggishly16. As E´gert (2007a) documents and Figure 3.4 visualises the rank-
ing of the price levels strongly correlates with the ordering of the countries in terms
of GDP per capita. This observation suggests that the price level is determined to
a great extent by economic development. Notwithstanding, one would expect that
a reduction of trade barriers (e.g. as a result of the European integration process)
and/or higher price transparency after the adoption of a common currency should
enhance the arbitrage process and reinforce price level convergence. However, the
literature seems to conclude almost unanimously that while price level convergence
in the EU and the Eurozone was spurred by the establishment of a common mar-
ket at the beginning of the 1990s the introduction of a common currency had no
significant effect (see e.g. the discussion in Crespo-Cuaresma et al. 2007). Hence,
it follows that the price level convergence in the Czech Republic will gradually con-
tinue as the country becomes richer in terms of GDP per capita. However, it seems
highly unlikely that the convergence process could receive a discrete one-time boost
after the euro adoption as a result of better price transparency.
But if it is not for higher price transparency are there any other forces which could
discretely change in the wake of the euro adoption and make inflation suddenly
accelerate? To answer this question in what follows we will have a close look at
the factors behind the price level convergence process usually put forward in the
15Source: New Cronos/Eurostat
16For instance Crucini and Shintani (2002) find substantial price level differences that persist
over time while Taylor and Taylor (2004) argue that such differences can be explained by the
existence of transaction costs. For further references see Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2007).
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literature such as the B-S-effect, deregulations of administered prices, the shift to
higher-quality goods, changes in pricing to market practices and the nominal ex-
change rate appreciation. However, in the context of the present paper we are not
only interested in the impact of these factors on price level convergence and inflation
but, particularly, in how their inflation impact will change after the euro adoption.
Goods Prices
As E´gert (2007a) describes in detail according to an extended Engel’s Law richer
growing households tend to spend less of their budget on food and their consump-
tion pattern also typically shifts towards goods of higher quality usually manifested
in brands. Naturally, higher-quality-goods are associated with higher prices. The
shift towards better goods on the demand side is accompanied by a catch-up-process
in terms of quality also on the domestic supply side. However, while this gradual
preference change contributes substantially to the price level convergence it should
not be reflected in higher inflation rates as it is not the same good that is getting
more expensive (see E´gert 2007b). Next E´gert (2007a) documents that even prices of
homogenous goods such as cars differ across euro area countries. This fact suggests
that producers take into account the disposable income in the particular economy
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and adjust their price setting to the purchasing power of households in that country.
As the income gap closes in the wake of the convergence process also prices of those
goods will rise and, in this case, push up also the inflation rate. In our estimation
later on we will approximate these two effects by linearly interpolated data on GDP
per capita at PPP obtained from the Eurostat New Cronos data base. It should be
added that both the quality effect and the pricing-to-market-effect will take place
irrespective of the exchange rate regime and should thus not be directly affected by
the euro adoption.
Balassa-Samuelson-effect
Some of the older studies estimated a rather sizable impact of the Balassa-Samuelson-
effect (B-S-effect) on inflation in the Czech republic, contributing e.g. 4.3 percentage
points in Golinelli and Orsi (2001) or 2.8 percentage points according to Sinn and
Reutter (2001). Then, however, Flek et al. (2002) found that the inflation impact
of the B-S-effect was very low (partially negative, depending on the methodology)
and thus negligible. As the topic has become vary fashionable a whole plethora of
research studies has emerged more recently confirming the finding that the infla-
tionary impact is rather low in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition
economies in general and in the Czech Republic in particular. E´gert, Halpern and
MacDonald (2006) provide a very comprehensive survey of the literature on this is-
sue and conclude that the inflation contribution of the B-S-effect is close to 0 in the
Czech Republic. Admittedly, these results are somewhat puzzling given the massive
productivity gains in manufacturing in these countries over the course of transition.
E´gert (2007b) puts forward several reasons for the small size of the B-S-effect which
basically question the assumptions of the B-S-model: i) Productivity growth may
not necessarily lead to a high wage growth in tradables, ii) due to imperfect homo-
geneity of labor wages may fail to equalise across sectors, iii) in some countries there
have been large productivity gains also in the non-tradable sector and, iv) perhaps
most importantly, productivity-driven inflation acceleration in the non-tradable sec-
tor is reflected in the overall prices index only to a small extent because of the low
share of non-tradables in the overall consumer basket. While Kovacs (2002) be-
lieves that the low impact of the B-S-effect can already give an upper estimate that
should become even weaker in the course of the catch-up process as productivity
differentials moderate Flek et. al (2002) disagree. According to them the produc-
tivity growth in the tradable sector will accelerate as the catching-up process moves
on because real convergence in the Czech Republic did not record any remarkable
progress throughout the 1990s. One of the most recent updates by E´gert (2007a)
seems to support this hypothesis as his upper bound estimates have increased com-
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pared to earlier results and range between 0.7 and 1.9 percentage points for the
Czech Republic.
Three different approaches have been employed in the empirical literature to derive
the size of the impact on inflation imputed by the B-S-effect. Following E´gert
(2007b) we will use in our econometric test the simple accounting framework which
assumes that changes in the productivity differential are proportionately translated
into the relative price change of non-tradables ∆pNT −∆pT = ∆prodT −∆prodNT .
At the same time, the impact of non-tradable inflation (∆pNT ) in excess of tradable
inflation (∆pT ) is established by the share of non-tradables in the CPI basket (1−α):
∆p = (1− α)(∆pNT −∆pT ). Therefore, the part of inflation ascribable to the B-S-
effect (pB−S) can be written as
∆pB−S = (1− α) (∆prodT −∆prodNT ) . (3.1)
The quarterly data is obtained from ARAD, the CNB’s time series database and
the Czech Statistical Office (CSO). Productivity is calculated as gross value added
in the respective sector divided by total hours worked. We approximate the trad-
able sector by manufacturing (D in the 17-sectoral decomposition of Eurostat) while
the non-tradable sector consists of construction (F in the Eurostat nomenclature)
and market services (G-K in the Eurostat nomenclature). Services where prices are
regulated such as agriculture, energy, water supply and public administration are
excluded because prices there do not necessarily react to productivity changes in a
market manner. The parameter (1−α) thus amounts to 0.25 (see E´gert (2007a). If
the B-S-effect plays a significant role in the Czech Republic then the productivity
differential should have a positive impact on inflation. However, also for the B-S-
effect it should be borne in mind that it is completely independent of the exchange
rate regime. In other words, even if there was a strong inflationary effect stemming
from relatively higher productivity gains in the tradable sector it will take place
irrespective of the currency used in that country.
Regulated prices
While prices of most goods and services have been set free and their inflation rates
reflect the market forces, there is still quite a considerable share of goods and ser-
vices for which prices are still administered. Following the broad concept of price
regulated service categories proposed by E´gert (2007b) our definition includes refuse
and sewerage collection, medical, dental and paramedical services, hospital services,
passenger transport by railway and by road, postal services, education, social pro-
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tection, cultural services, rents and energy prices related to housing.17 Using the
three-digit COICOP disaggregation level of the HICP from New Cronos/Eurostat
the share of administered prices in the consumer basket amounts according to this
definition to approximately 20% in the Czech Republic, a number very similar to the
euro area level and we can thus conjecture that increases of administered prices will
have a significant impact on the overall inflation. Moreover, this impact is reinforced
by the fact that the inflation of regulated services has been almost persistently above
the inflation rate of the overall consumer basket as can be seen in Figure 3.5. The
chart thus suggests that if regulated prices are adjusted the modification is substan-
tial in relative terms.
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
HICP
CPI
Inflation of regulated services
Figure 3.5: Inflation of price regulated services vs. HICP/CPI
E´gert (2007b) puts forward three main reasons why regulated prices are likely to
rise faster than the overall CPI also in the future. Firstly, prices of some of the
regulated categories might still be below the cost recovery ratio (e.g. rents) and/or
below the EU level such as electricity and gas which reached in the Czech Repub-
17Though price regulation mostly concerns services there are also some goods such as pharma-
ceutical products, alcoholic beverages or tobacco whose prices are not entirely market determined
and could be included in the definition.
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lic in 2006 some 70% of the EU-level. Secondly, the capital stock of some sectors
such as railways or public transportation is outdated and urgently needs massive
investments. Unless the latter can be fully financed from public subsidies and/or EU
Structural and Cohesion funds price increases will be inevitable. Lastly, the degree
of regulation which is closely interlinked with the ownership structure and level of
liberalisation in those sectors is often subject to hot political debates. Some politi-
cians subject to the political business cycle might be reluctant to price increases
and prefer to postpone them for later, especially after elections. At the same time
in some parts of the political spectrum there might be quite a strong resistance to
privatisation or market liberalisation, if they are possible in the particular sector,
which would increase efficiency and mitigate price increases.
The last point is certainly also strongly related to the question about how much
regulated prices will be affected by the euro adoption. Generally speaking, if a
country interested in adopting the euro does not meet the Maastricht price stability
criterion with a convenient margin - which might be the case in transition CEE
for reasons described above - it is natural that policy makers will not be particu-
larly keen on putting the inflation rate further under strain by adjusting regulated
prices more than necessary. Hence, since sustainability of the inflation criterion is
not formally required it might provide incentives for the country’s political repre-
sentatives to postpone more than indispensable hikes of administered prices until
after the euro adoption. If the latter was the case, inflation might indeed appear to
have accelerated as a consequence of the euro introduction which would then be the
easiest patsy to blame. A similar materialization of this incentive structure seems
to have happened in Greece, where the fulfilment of the inflation criterion prior to
the euro adoption was helped by cuts in indirect taxes and gentlemen’s agreements
between the government and commercial and industrial enterprises, as well as ser-
vice providers (see ECB 2000).18
18Annual inflation in Greece soared from 2.1% in 1999 to 3.9% in 2002 which might have been,
to some extent caused by the non-renewal of the gentlemen’s agreements. For instance the Athens
News Agency reported on August 22, 2002 in ’Finance minister pledges intensified efforts against
inflation’:
”This new and worrying surge in inflation signals a clear-cut failure of the government’s policy
of ’gentlemen’s agreements (...) These agreements are based on an unbridled operation of markets
and a lack of effective checks and measures against violators”, Dimitris Papadimoulis, economic
and social affairs spokesman of the Coalition of the Left and Progress. He added that state-owned
companies had often led the pack in unjustified rate rises, setting an example for the rest of the
market, which meant that price hikes were transferred down to the consumer.
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Nominal exchange rate and the exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) on
Consumer Prices
If talking about the nominal exchange rate we have to distinguish clearly between
its role in the price level convergence process and its impact on inflation. Nominal
appreciation, for instance, increases the price level expressed in euros immediately
(numerator in ep
p∗ with variables defined as above) and thus speeds up the price level
convergence. For the inflation development, however, not necessarily the nominal
appreciation as such matters but the pass-through of exchange rate movements on
consumer prices. On the hand, the higher the ERPT and the higher the nominal
appreciation rate, the bigger the dampening effect on the overall inflation. On the
other hand, however, the higher the ERPT the less pronounced will be the effect of
nominal appreciation on price level convergence as in ep
p∗ the rise in e is compensated
by less strongly rising p as a result of the ERPT. Or conversely, a lower ERPT im-
plies a more significant convergence of price levels but provides less help in curbing
inflation.
The extent to which exchange rate changes are translated into domestic prices hinges
primarily on the price setting practice and the composition of imports. The ERPT
will be zero if firms set prices of imported goods in the local currency while the
exchange rate movements will be completely reflected in the import price if firms
invoice in the export country’s currency. However, the eventual effect of exchange
rate changes on consumer prices will vary depending on whether the country imports
rather final goods included in the consumer basket or intermediate goods by which
the ERPT on consumer prices will be watered down in the production process. In
addition, E´gert (2007b) argues that expectations are another important factor for
the pass-through strengths. In an inflation targeting regime where expectations are
anchored by credibly communicated inflation targets and not by the exchange rate
itself the ERPT should be low. Moreover, Taylor (2000) coins the idea that the fact
that the ERPT has declined over time and that it is typically lower in developed
market economies is ascribable to generally lower inflation rates. In a microeco-
nomic model he shows that with declining inflation people perceive cost changes
as less persistent, adjust prices less frequently and thus incorporate exchange rate
changes less often.
Given these arguments, how important is the exchange rate pass-through in the
Czech Republic? On the one hand, it is certainly a rather small and open economy
with a relatively high share of imported final and intermediate goods. On the other
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Figure 3.6: Exchange rate vs. HICP (y-o-y change) in the Czech Republic
hand, the CNB operates an inflation targeting regime with a long and successful
track record and the Czech economy has experienced a strong disinflation over the
course of the transition period. Before looking at empirical results Figure 3.6 pro-
vides a visual appetizer for the strength of the ERPT in the Czech Republic since
2004. It depicts the exchange rate (koruna vs. euro) and inflation development in
two forms, as a line (with the corresponding Hodrick-Prescott-trend) and a scatter
plot. As can be seen in the left panel, while there has been a clear appreciation
tendency of the koruna vis-a`-vis the euro, the inflation rate has drifted upward. The
reverse trend of the two series has been particularly strong since mid 2007. The
right panel provides another phrasing of the same content as it suggests a rather
weak, and, worse still, negative relationship between exchange rate appreciation and
the inflation rate.
Hence, it is not surprising that also empirical studies come to the conclusion that
the ERPT in the Czech Republic is quite tenuous. While e.g. Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2007)
find that the one-year ERPT amounts to about 0.6 many other studies estimate it
close to 0 or sometimes even negative (see e.g. Darvas (2001) or Coricelli, Jazbec
and Masten (2004)). Coricelli, E´gert and MacDonald (2006) report the average of
non-negative, effective pass-through estimates from a literature survey reaching mere
0.2. In the context of the present paper we are interested in the pass-through of the
koruna-euro-exchange rate. Therefore, we will approximate the pass-through from
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the Eurozone by including an openness indicator defined along the lines of E´gert
(2007a) as the nominal exchange rate of the euro vis-a`-vis the koruna multiplied by
imports from the ’old’ EU-15 Member States19 relative to GDP. An increase of this
indicator due to an appreciation of the koruna and/or higher imports from the EU-
15 would thus be expected to result in a lower inflation and should therefore carry
a negative sign. The quarterly available data on imports and GDP were obtained
from Eurostat and had to be linearly interpolated while Thomson Financial provides
exchange rates on a daily basis and we took monthly averages. Alternatively to the
openness indicator we will test the relevance of the exchange rate on inflation by
including a simple annual rate of change of the exchange rate.
Exchange rate development
Strictly speaking, it is only secondary how relevant the exchange rate pass-through
is now or has been up to now. This paper wants to shed some light on how much
will inflation be affected after the euro adoption. Therefore, even if the substantial
nominal trend appreciation of the koruna with respect to the euro had a considerable
dampening effect on inflation at this moment it can not be concluded straightfor-
wardly that inflation will rise by the same amount after joining the EMU. Between
1993 and 2007 the koruna gained on average some 1.4% against the euro in nominal
terms while the appreciation was much stronger in the recent years (about 3% since
2000). The relevant question is though, how will the euro adoption (possibly also
in other countries) affect those factors that stand behind the nominal appreciation.
If, for instance, the value increase of the koruna vis-a`-vis the euro was driven pre-
dominantly by speculative capital flows which will disappear after joining the EMU
anyway, the costs of non-existent dampening effect on inflation would be low. On
the contrary, if the appreciation was driven primarily by e.g. FDI it could be argued
that since such capital flows will persist also after the euro adoption the inflationary
effect will be rather high. Even then though, what would happen to FDI-flows if
the Czech Republic was the only country in the region without the euro? Would
not investors prefer the euroised neighbours? These are just some issues meant to
exemplify the rather big amount of uncertainty related to this question.
19Apart from the EU-12 defined above EU-15 contains also the UK, Denmark and Sweden.
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3.3.1.2 Natural interest rate too low?
It is not only the exchange rate that is abandoned after the EMU entry but also
the autonomous monetary policy run by the national central bank.20 Unless the
monetary union is a perfectly optimal currency area it is natural that the interest
rate set for so many countries might not necessarily be the most convenient one for
each particular member state. Hence, it could happen that with the introduction
of the euro the country adopts too loose a monetary policy bringing about inflation
acceleration. In other words, if the country’s natural interest rate, defined along
the lines of Laubach and Williams (2001) as the short-term interest rate at which
output converges to potential and inflation is stable, is higher than the interest rate
set for the Eurozone then inflation might speed up. In order to get some feeling for
how big this risk is, we have to answer two questions:
1. Does the natural interest rate in the Czech Republic differ significantly from the
one in the Eurozone?
2. If it does, how sensitive is inflation to deviations from the natural interest rate?
Since the capital/labor ratio which determines the relative price of capital changes
over time, in transition economies typically increases, also the natural interest rate
defined as above has to be time-varying (see Lipschitz et. al 2006). Different meth-
ods have been employed in the literature to estimate time-varying natural interest
rates (TVNIR), ranging from various versions of the Taylor rule in Orphanides and
Williams (2002), a simple macroeconomic model in Laubach and Williams (2001)
where equilibrium interest rates and output gap are modelled as unobserved compo-
nents to a DSGE model with sticky prices and wages in Smets and Wouters (2002).
To our knowledge, there has been only one paper thus far estimating a nominal,
time-varying policy neutral rate for the Czech Republic by Horvath (2007). Based
on various forward- and backward-looking specifications of simple Taylor-type mon-
etary policy rules he finds that the nominal policy neutral rate decreased form some
5% in 2001 to around 2% at the end of 2005 and increased subsequently to some
2.5% in 2006. Moreover, he concludes that the deviation of the actual nominal in-
terest rate from the policy neutral (equilibrium) rate is a useful predictor for future
level and change of inflation.
We, in contrast, will proceed in the spirit of Crespo-Cuaresma, Gnan and Ritzberger-
20To which extent the monetary policy can be autonomous in small and open economies shall
be left aside.
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Gru¨nwald (2004) and estimate a TVNIR for the Czech Republic in a parsimonious
multivariate unobserved-components-model (UCM). The estimation is thus based
merely on the statistical properties without imposing any economic theory. This
method which goes back to Harvey (1989), who aims at decomposing the time-series
in a trend component (µt), a cyclical component (φt) and an irregular component
(ut). The vector zt = (rt, yt, pit) consisting of real interest rate rt, output yt and
inflation pit can thus be written as
zt = µt + φt + ut;ut v IID (0,Σu) (3.2)
where the multivariate trend component µt follows a random walk with drift κt
which follows a random walk itself:
µt =µt−1 + κt−1 + τt;τt v IID (0,Στ ) (3.3)
κt =κt−1 + ψt;ψt v IID (0,Σψ) (3.4)
In addition, the error terms τt, ψt and ut are assumed to be mutually uncorre-
lated. The cyclical component is defined as a sine-cosine wave with time-evolving
parameters21 (
φt
φ∗t
)
= ρ
[(
cosλ sinλ
− sinλ cosλ
)
⊗ I
](
φt−1
φ∗t−1
)
+
(
ωt
ω∗t
)
(3.5)
where (ωt,ω
∗
t ) v IID (0, I ⊗ Σω) are also assumed to be uncorrelated with other
errors, the dampening factor ρ ∈ 〈0, 1〉 and frequency λ ∈ 〈0, 2pi〉 are assumed to be
time-invariant and equal across variables in z . The state space model formulation
enables the application of the Kalman filter. Via the prediction error decomposi-
tion the Kalman filter opens the gate to the maximum likelihood estimation of the
unknown parameters (Harvey 1989:100 et seq.). We will opt for filtered or real-time
estimates which use information available up to t− 1 while forming expectations on
the unobservable state at time t (αft = E(αt | {zt}t−1t=0).22
21A univariate (non-stochastic) cycle can be most conveniently expressed as a mixture of sine
and cosine waves: ψt = α cosλt + β sinλt, t = 1, ..., T. The period of the cycle (time taken to go
through the complete sequence of values) is given by 2pi/λ while functions of α and β determine
the amplitude and the phase. As Harvey(1989:39) shows this model can be rewritten ψt as the
following recursion:
(
ψt
ψ∗t
)
=
[
cosλ sinλ
− sinλ cosλ
] [
ψt−1
ψ∗t−1
]
with ψ0 = α and ψ∗0 = β.
22In contrast, smoothed estimates would exploit information contained in the entire sample
(αst = E(αt | {zt}Tt=0).
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In line with the literature we use ex-ante real interest rates defined as the prevailing
three-month money market rate in t, available at Eurostat, minus inflation between
t − 1 and t. We used the longest available monthly inflation series on the CPI
which can be retrieved from the OECD and our estimation sample thus ranged from
January 1993 to December 2006. However, as a robustness check we alternatively
employed a much shorter series (starting in January 1997) on CPI excluding food
and energy and the HICP obtained from Eurostat without significant changes in
the results. Output y we approximated by the logged seasonally adjusted industrial
production which is available on a monthly basis from the OECD.
In order to estimate the model initial values for cycle determining parameters have
to be specified. As noted above though the parameters λ and ρ are assumed to be
identical for all variables and they should be set so that the cyclical component of
the model corresponds to the business cycle. We tested λ-values that imply busi-
ness cycle length ranging between two and six years and ρ-values between 0.7 and
0.99. unfortunately, for the Czech Republic we cannot confirm the finding made by
Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004) for the EU that the estimated parameters are robust
to the choice of the starting values of λ and ρ in a multivariate model. This might
be due to not really synchronized cycles of the three variables over the course of the
transition period and/or due to the substantially shorter time series which might be
a problem as the simultaneous estimation reduces the degrees of freedom. However,
estimation results are robust to the initial specification of the parameter values if a
univariate approach is employed. Having to choose between these two second-best
possibilities we decided to opt for the univariate, but robust approach. Moreover,
estimation results improved if the trend component was assumed to be smooth with
the variance of the error term τt equal to 0.
Figure 3.7 and Table 3.3 in the Appendix display the results of the estimation of
the univariate unobserved components model for the Czech Republic. While the
estimated dampening factor ρ is 0.841 the frequency parameter λ amounts to 0.32
implying a cycle length of about 19 months. The Durbin-Watson test statistic sug-
gests that a first-order autocorrelation of the residuals should be no major issue.
For comparison, it should be noted that for industrial production the results of the
univariate estimation look significantly different. Whereas ρ is 0.941, λ is close to
0.15 which corresponds to a cycle length of nearly 3.5 years. These results seem to
match much more closely the findings obtained by Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004) in
a multivariate setting for the EMU. The discrepancy between the statistic features
of the two series in our estimations might thus explain why they are difficult to
squeeze into a multivariate model.
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Figure 3.7: Real interest rate in the Czech Republic and the time-varying natural
interest rate
At the beginning of this subsection we raised two questions. The first one - how
much does the real interest rate in the Czech Republic deviate from the one in the
EMU? - is addressed in Figure 3.8. The chart displays the difference between the
actual real interest rate in the Czech Republic and in the EMU (the most volatile
line) and two versions of the differential between the natural rate of interest (NRI)
in both currency areas (the two smooth lines). While the NRI for the Czech Re-
public was calculated in a univarite UCM for reasons explained above, for the EMU
we calculated the NRI both in a univariate UCM (blue/solid line) as well as in a
multivariate UCM (red/dashed line) since for the EMU a multivariate version did
work quite well and we came very close to the results obtained by Crespo-Cuaresma
et al. (2004). Eyeballing the NRI differential it can be seen that a multivariate
model tends to yield a smoothed cyclical component (the difference between the
actual series and the trend) with slightly smaller amplitude. The figure suggests
that since 2001 both measures of the NRI differential have stayed within the grey
interval [−1, 1]. The maximum deviation of the actual Czech real interest rate from
the EMU reached some 2.5 percentage points on either side since 2001.
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Figure 3.8: Real rate and NRI differentials between the Czech Republic and the
EMU
What has been said so far is subject to one major caveat. The real interest rate
series for the Czech Republic which was used in our calculations necessarily includes
risk premia that reflect the markets’ perception of risk, particularly perils related to
exchange rate changes and possibly also to the fiscal position of the country. These
risk premia, however, will disappear after the euro adoption. Therefore, if we want
to get some feeling for how much the Czech real interest rate (actual or the NRI)
will deviate from its EMU counterpart under a common currency for the sake of
a fair analysis we first have to purge the real rate series from the risk premium.
Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004) develop a method to eliminate the risk premium
from the nominal money market rates from which a synthetic, risk-adjusted real
rate series can easily be constructed.
In the model, the time-varying risk premium is defined as the residual part of the
nominal interest rate spread with the EMU short-term interest rate that cannot be
explained by differentials in inflation expectations and business cycle disharmony.
Hence, the nominal interest rate spread between the Czech Republic and the EMU
(scrt ) is regressed on the output gap differential (g
cr
t −gemut ) and the inflation expecta-
tion differential between the two regions
[
E
(
picrt+12 | {picrk }tk=1
)− E (piemut+12 | {piemuk }tk=1)]:
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scrt = β0 + β1(g
cr
t − gemut ) (3.6)
+β2
[
E
(
picrt+12 | {picrk }tk=1
)− E (piemut+12 | {piemuk }tk=1)]+ γt
While we use as a measure for the output gap the cyclical component of industrial
production obtained in the previous estimation of a univariate UCM, the inflation
expectations are computed as 12 months ahead forecasts in an autoregressive model
whose length23 is reestimated at each point in time t so as to minimize the Akaike
information criterion. In order to estimate the inflation expectations we thus had
to split the sample into two parts and it turned out that the best performance was
achieved if the first forecasts were computed for January 1998. Hence, the part of the
sample between 1:1993 and 1:1997 was used to compute the inflation forecasts while
for the actual estimation of equation (3.6) the second half of the sample between
1:1998 and 12:2006 was employed. Due to possible correlations between the error
term γt and the regressors
24 the estimation was carried out by means of a two-stage
least squares estimation in which lags ranging between six and twelve months of the
output gap and inflation expectation differentials were used as instruments. Table
3.4 in the Appendix shows the results of this estimation.
According to the definition spelled out above the risk premium incorporated in the
Czech nominal interest rate corresponds to the sum of the estimated constant β̂0
and the random shock γ̂t. Hence, the nominal interest rate purged from the risk
premium corresponds to
iadjt = i
cr
t − β̂0 − γ̂t (3.7)
In Figure 3.9 we plot the adjusted real rate against the original series and for the
sake of comparison also the real rate of the EMU. It might surprise that the adjusted
real rate has been persistently above the actual real rate since mid 1999. In other
words, the figure suggests that there has been a negative risk premium in the Czech
Republic which might reflect the trend appreciation of the koruna vis-a`-vis the
euro.25 In analogy to Figure 3.8 we show in Figure 3.10 the difference between
adjusted real rate in the Czech Republic and the actual real rate in the EMU as well
23At each t the maximum lag length is 12.
24Inflation expectations, for instance, might be driven by the same factors as the risk premium.
25Between June 1999 and December 2006 the koruna appreciated in nominal terms against the
euro by more than 25%.
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as the two versions of the NRI-differentials. Whereas the adjusted real rate deviated
at most by slightly more than 1 percentage point from the real rate in the EMU
since the beginning of 2004, the two NRI-differentials have declined rapidly over the
past couple of years and are currently close to 0. It also strikes that while the actual
real rate was below the EMU level in the last three years or so of the sample, the
risk premium adjusted real rate has been well above the EMU rate since mid 2006.
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Figure 3.9: Adjusted and originial real rate in the Czech Republic versus real rate
in the EMU
Hence, the evidence provided so far suggests that despite a significant convergence
of the Czech real and natural interest rates towards the EMU-level (particularly if
purged from the risk premium) there remains some little gap. Moreover, it is not
quite unambiguous which sign this gap would have if the euro was adopted now.
Nevertheless, in the next step we shall address the second question raised at the be-
ginning of this subsection. Namely, would it actually matter for the inflation path
in the Czech Republic if the EMU NRI deviated from its Czech counterpart? In
other words, we are wondering how sensitive the inflation in the Czech Republic is to
deviations from the natural rate. In order to get some feeling for how relevant pos-
sibly desynchronized natural rates between the EMU and the Czech Republic might
be after the euro adoption we will approximate this future elasticity by the current
sensitivity of the inflation to the deviation of the Czech real rate from the NRI. We
89
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
univariate adjusted NRI differential
multivariate adjusted NRI differential
adjusted real rate differential
Figure 3.10: Adjusted real rate and NRI differentials between the Czech Republic
and the EMU
will use both the original as well as the adjusted series although Crespo-Cuaresma et
al. (2004) conclude that the adjusted series serves better as an indicator of inflation
development. Notwithstanding, it should be emphasized at this point that the nat-
ural rate of interest is an unobserved variable and the estimation thereof depends
essentially on the economic specification and the econometric method. A whole
raft of literature documents that policy rules based on such unobserved variables,
particularly if they are estimated in real time, are subject to a substantial level of
uncertainty (see Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004) and other references therein). For
this reason we will use in our regressions as an alternative the NRI estimated by
Horva´th (2007)26.
3.3.2 Temporary factors related to the euro changeover
As has been shown above, although the overall impact was moderate, in some coun-
tries and some segments prices did increase substantially after the changeover. In
26Horva´th (2007), to which we are grateful for sharing his results with us, estimates nominal
neutral rates which we will transform to real rates as described above.
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most cases prices returned to the pre-changeover level and only in a few industries,
particularly services such as gastronomy or cinemas, the effect was not transitory.
However, there were big differences among the countries. Eife (2005) who focuses
on the price setting behaviour around the changeover in Austria and Germany finds
that unlike in the latter in Austria both the transitory and the persistent increases
were practically absent (despite the substantial increase in perceived inflation) bar-
ring a few isolated exceptions such as hairdressing or language courses.
The most evident costs of a currency changeover are the so called menu costs, i.e.
costs of replacing the price tags and menus. The higher the menu costs are the
bigger the incentive for the firms to carry out intended price adjustments at one
stroke with the changeover. Hence, price modifications in the weeks or months
preceding the euro adoption will be postponed, those planned for the period after
the changeover will be brought forward . Menu costs are the usual explanation the
literature provides for the discrete price jumps that could be observed particularly
in the service sector.27 However, Eife (2005) concludes that price spikes in some
sectors can barely be explained by menu costs for two reasons. First, the increases
were too high so that they could be attributed solely to menu costs and second, if
the menu cost argument washed than one should observe significantly less frequent
price changes before and after the changeover which is not the case for most analysed
goods and services categories. In contrast, according to the same study two factors
appear to have been more important for transitory price changes. On the one hand,
the so called ’initial confusion’ argument seems to have been at play which says that
the public is puzzled by unfamiliar coins and notes. In this situation similar to the
initial confusion one experiences in a foreign country firms might be attempted to
take advantage of this sort of a temporary increase of their market power.28 On the
other hand, however, there was a counteracting effect due to the higher sensitivity
and awareness of the public and the media to price jumps. It thus turns out that
big corporations which were certainly under a much harsher media pressure were
much more hesitant to raise their prices and some of them, such as fast food chains
in Austria, even welcomed the opportunity to grab the headlines for reducing the
prices. Moreover, Eife (2005) finds that those services for which permanent price
hikes could be observed are also typically sold by small, only locally active firms
27See for example Hobijn et al. (2004) whose sticky price model generates a blip in inflation of
the same magnitude observed in the data which can be explained by menu costs.
28This view is supported also by Ehrmann (2006) who found that the denomination of prices in
a new currency had increased the information-processing requirements for consumers by more than
for sellers. In addition, this wedge grows with the complexity of the currency conversion rates.
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and are standardized in the sense that irrespective of the provider the consumer has
quite a precise expectation of what she gets. Eife (2005) with reference to Tirole
(1988) thus argues that these are emblematic characteristics of markets for which
collusive behavior is typical and that the price increases were to a great extent driven
by a collective shift to a new, higher equilibrium. Yet based on data for Austria
that managed to create an environment in which both transitory and permanent
price increases were rare Eife (2005) concludes some normative recommendations
that should help render the changeover a mere nominal conversion event: To ad-
dress the initial confusion a sufficiently long period of dual pricing is necessary.29 In
the light of the Slovenian experience, however, not too heavy a reliance should be
placed on dual price display as an anti-inflation measure in itself, and a substantial
emphasis should be put also on fair-pricing agreements between the government and
the private sector (see Deloitte Consulting 2007). Moreover, as the findings made
by Ehrmann (2006) suggest, the less complex the conversion rate the smaller the
confusion of the consumers and thus the smaller the increase of firms’ market power.
To reduce the incentive for collective price adjustments within a short period of time
and to make the transition more gradual the replacement should extend over several
months.30 In addition, to enhance the countervailing effect price observatories and
hotlines operated e.g. by the statistical office or the central bank but also by private
institutions could be set up or stimulated. Although the major threat for ’sinners’
would probably be the attention by the media an enforceable legal framework would
certainly also help to curb the incentive to abuse the changeover.
As we have seen in Figure 3.1 irrespective of the actual inflation path the perceived
inflation rose in all countries following the introduction of euro coins and notes.
Aucremanne et al. 2007 confirm formally the hypothesis that this perception break
was significantly induced by the euro changeover. In contrast to the widespread
opinion in the literature, they do not find any support for the finding that percep-
tions are systematically biased by frequently purchased goods and services (see e.g.
Del Giovane and Sabbatini 2006) or that the perception gap was more pronounced
for consumers with some specific socio-economic characteristics (see e.g. Fluch and
Stix 2007 or Linde´n 2006). Hence, whereas the findings on these issues might not be
29In Austria, after the expiration of the compulsory period between October 2001 and February
2002 in which prices had to be displayed in Schilling and Euro dual pricing was still allowed after
that. In Germany, in contrast, dual pricing was possible, not obligatory, prior to January 2002 but
was no longer allowed after the 2-months transition period.
30While it was more than 12 months in Austria, in Germany the replacement period lasted only
2 months.
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unambiguous, Traut-Mattausch et al 2004 provide strong experimental evidence sug-
gesting that people’s judgments on price trends are biased towards price increases if
prices are denominated in the new and unfamiliar currency, the euro. These results
are thus probably another manifestation of an anomaly that Samuelson and Zeck-
hauser (1988) called the ’status quo bias’ - people’s preference for the current state
and their implied mistrust of new states. This phenomenon like other anomalies is
a materialization of the so called ’loss aversion’ - an asymmetry first documented by
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) - which states that the disutility of losing an object
is greater than the utility associated with acquiring it (see Kahneman et al. 1991).
In the spirit of the status quo bias the disadvantages of a change thus loom higher
in people’s minds than the advantages of it. The size of this misalignment depends
certainly crucially on the expectations people form on the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the change. The expectation formation, in turn, is undoubtedly essentially
influenced by the media, the institutions and the authorities people trust in such as
high-rank politicians, the central bank or commercial banks.31,32 In the Czech Re-
public a great part of the discussion on costs and benefits of the euro centres around
the inflationary impact of the euro and as has been already alluded to a vast majority
of the (inter alia prominent) discussants supports the hypothesis that the euro will
lead to a marked inflation acceleration. So it is probably little surprising that 80%
of the Czechs, 6 percentage points above the average in the New Member States,
believe that the euro will increase prices when it is first introduced and two thirds
of the respondents are afraid of abuses and cheating on prices during the changeover
(see Eurobarometer 2007). A balanced and detailed information campaign on the
impacts of the euro changeover as well as a set of orchestrated measures proposed in
the previous paragraph would certainly have an impact on these figures. Most likely
they would tame those fears and accelerated inflation expectations because as Fluch
and Stix (2007) and, in a slightly different phrasing, also Linde´n (2006) document
uninformed respondents tend to have significantly higher both inflation perception
and expectation values than the informed ones. Obviously, it is impossible to control
for the effects of the current or future information campaign. However, we will test
in our regression how inflation expectations impact actual inflation rates. If this
impact turned out to be rather strong as e.g. Paloviita and Vire´n (2005) show for
the euro area in a VAR using inflation forecasts from the OECD then the numbers
on expected inflationary effects of the euro should probably be addressed with more
31Del Giovane and Sabbatini (2006) or Boeri (2004), for instance, provide evidence suggesting
that there is a positive relationship between inflation perception and the attention the press pays
to the phenomenon.
32For the preference ranking of trusted distributors of information see Eurobarometer (2007).
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vigour well in advance of the euro introduction as they could end up in self-fulfilling
equilibria with higher inflation rates. The data on qualitative inflation expectations
are collected from the Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business and Consumer
Surveys regularly conducted by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for
Economic and Financial Affairs. Similarly to the perceived inflation the series on
inflation expectations is a balance statistic calculated as the difference between a
weighted proportion of respondents stating that prices will increase and those stating
that prices will stay the same or fall.33
3.4 Econometric evidence
3.4.1 Method and data description
In this section we now proceed to test econometrically the relative importance of the
factors collected so far along with other cyclical and external variables the choice
of which we base primarily on the results obtained by E´gert (2007a). Given the
availability of the data and the auxiliary calculations described above the adjusted
sample ranges from January 1998 to December 2006. All variables as used in the
model are stationary according to the ADF test on conventional significance levels
and if not available on monthly basis they were linearly interpolated.
In addition to the variables defined so far we included in the regression also the
output gap for which we use three different measures: the cyclical component of in-
dustrial production relative to its trend resulting from the estimation of a unilateral
unobserved components model described above and two output gap measures ob-
tained from the European Commission.34 The other cyclical variables are the annual
rate of change of unit labor costs and the y-o-y change of central government expen-
ditures relative to GDP. The set of structural variables contains three factors that
have been spelled out above - the productivity differential, the annual change of reg-
ulated prices and the GDP per capita.35 Concerning external factors apart from the
33There are six possible answers to the question: ”By comparison with the past 12 months,
how do you expect that consumer prices will develop in the next 12 months? They will...”
A(1) ”increase more rapidly”; A(2) ”increase at the same rate”; A(3) ”increase at a slower
rate”; A(4) ”stay about the same”; A(5) ”fall” and A(6) ”do not know”. The bal-
ance statistic is thus computed as: Bit = Ait(1) + 0.5Ait(2) − 0.5Ait(4) − Ait(5) (See:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy finance/indicators/businessandconsumersurveys en.htm)
34The measures are defined as the relative gap between actual and, respectively, trend or potential
gross domestic product at 2000 market prices.
35Since GDP per capita appears to be growing almost exponentially we defined this variable as
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two already mentioned alternatives which are supposed to capture the exchange rate
pass-through we include also the y-o-y change of the crude oil price. Next we con-
structed two dummy variables for VAT increases and decreases, respectively. They
equal 1 in those months in which the VAT rate was raised/lowered and also in those
months in which a product or service group was moved from the preferential rate
to the basic rate or vice versa. If two counteracting effects occurred simultaneously
then we set that dummy equal to one for which the consumption basket weight of the
goods and services in question was bigger. In all other months the dummies equal
zero.36 Finally, we include inflation expectations and three alternative measures for
the deviation of the real interest rate from the natural interest rate on the grounds
developed above. A neat list of all variables can be seen in Table 3.5 in the Appendix.
To account also for the impact of past inflation values on future inflation we will
employ an autoregressive distributed lag model of the form
pit = µ+
p∑
i=1
γipit−i +
r∑
j=0
βjxt−j + εt (3.8)
where pit stands for inflation, xt−j for a vector of regressors lagged by j. The error
term εt is assumed to be serially uncorrelated and homoskedastic. Given the limited
length of the sample we restrict the set of lags to p ∈ {1, 6, 12} and r ∈ {0, 1, 6, 12}
which should still allow us to capture the contemporaneous as well as the short-,
mid- and long-term effect of each variable. The estimations are carried out using
OLS. However, to determine the lag length for each variable we first tried two alter-
native model selection techniques. The first one was a general-to-specific strategy
based on hypothesis testing. We thus started out from the biggest model including
all variables and all possible lags. Then we proceeded iteratively and in each round
we eliminated the least significant regressor (=variable-lag-combination), the one
with the highest p-value, until we were left with a parsimonious model containing
only regressors significant on the five percent level. The second strategy selects it-
eratively from all possible models of which there are 2K , where K stands for the
number of initial regressors, the one with the lowest Schwarz Information Criterion
(SIC). Since the maximum number of initial variables we tested was 13, the implied
maximum number of regressors was 51 (= 4*13-1). If the computation of one iter-
ation step took only, say, 0,001 seconds than it would take more than 71 000 years
the month-on-month change of the y-o-y growth of GDP per capita which can be interpreted as
the short term acceleration of the GDP/capita growth rate.
36I would like to thank my mother, a tax adviser, for helping me out with the tedious work
through the tax code.
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to go through all models. Therefore we had to reduce the intractable model space
which we did by means of the so called Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model Composite
(MC3) method which was described in detail in Chapter 2 of the present dissertation.
As was also briefly alluded to in Chapter 2 there are some problems with such
model selection strategies. Under the test based general-to-specific strategy the
model space is strongly limited as it starts from the biggest model whose size is
then iteratively reduced but it does not take into account possible model alterna-
tives with variables that have been already excluded. Implicitly this procedure thus
imposes a rather strong restriction as it presumes to know a limited model space
in which the true model has to be included. In fact, however, this is not the case.
Given the lack of an unambiguous theoretical framework that would uniquely deter-
mine which variables and lags are to be chosen in an equation attempting to explain
inflation, we do not know either the true model or a restricted subset of all possible
models from which the true model has to be recruited. Hence, we face a substantial
level of model uncertainty that has to be taken into account. Although the strategy
based on the SIC does in principal consider all perceivable models it did not perform
much better. Namely, both strategies differ strongly in the models they choose and
they do not converge to one model as one would expect owing to the fact that they
are extremely sensitive to the definition of variables and the initial specification.
Yang (2004) who compares hypothesis testing and model selection strategies both
theoretically and empirically concludes that ”when model selection rules give very
different answers, model combining is a better alternative approach for estimation
and prediction. With a proper weighting, the large variability of the estimator from
model selection can be substantially reduced.”
A way to combine models with a proper weighting is the Bayesian model averaging
(BMA) methodology which we already employed and described in detail in Chapter
2 and to which the reader may refer. In a nutshell, the BMA algorithm proposes
averaging of the parameter values over all (relevant) alternative models using pos-
terior model probabilities as respective weights. In addition, for each variable we
sum the posterior probabilities of those models visited by the MC3 algorithm that
include the respective variable. This sum, the so called posterior inclusion proba-
bility, is a measure that captures the relative importance of the different covariates
as determinants of inflation. It can be interpreted as the probability that a given
variable belongs to the true specification. Since we assign equal priors to all mod-
els, P(Mi) = P(Mj) for all Mi, Mj ∈ M , our prior on the inclusion probability
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of each variable is 0.5.37 Moreover, we can also use the inclusion probability as a
model selection criterion and combine the Bayesian and frequentist approach. In a
Bayesian based ’frequentist check’ we thus keep only those regresors whose model
averaged parameters have an inclusion probability equal to or greater than the prior
benchmark 0.5 and run a new estimation only with these regressors.
3.4.2 Estimation results
The application of the BMA methodology in combination with the MC3 algorithm
produced much more robust results than either of the two other methods. The se-
lection procedure chose under most amendments the model presented in Table 3.1.
We report under ’BMA’ the parameter averages and inclusion probabilities of those
regressors with an inclusion probability equal to or greater than 0.5. Under ’Fre-
quentist check’ the reader may find the usual ’frequentist’ output from a regression
run with those regressors that have been selected using inclusion probability as a
model selection criterion.
37There are 2K¯−1 models including a given variable and 2K¯ total models, so the prior inclusion
probability of a given variable is 2K¯−1/2K¯=0.5.
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As can be seen, except for the productivity differential the regressors have an inter-
pretable sign and the estimates reveal interesting information on the determinants
of inflation in the Czech Republic. While inflation appears highly persistent in the
short-run, in the long-run high inflation rates tend to reduce future inflation. The
latter is probably a result of the strong disinflation process that took place in the
Czech Republic in the sample period. Another or additional interpretation of this
result could be that restrictive measures of monetary policy implemented as a reac-
tion to high inflation kick in with a 12-month-lag. Adjustments of regulated prices
have a strong and long-lasting impact on overall inflation. Inflation typically rises
in the month in which administered prices are raised but falls in the immediately
following month. A weak, positive correlation between regulated and overall prices
is found also for the 12-month-lag. The long-run effect of the regulated price infla-
tion, which can be in an ARDL model computed as
∑r
j=1 βj
1−∑pi=1 γi
where βj and γi refer to the model specification in (3.8) (see Greene 2003), is 0.154
meaning that a 10% increase of regulated prices raises overall inflation in the long-
run by 1.5 percentage points. In addition, if today’s real interest rate deviates from
the natural interest rate upwards by 1 percentage point the inflation in 12 months
will be dampened by 0.3 percentage points. These results appear plausible and the
only variable we struggle with is the productivity differential supposed to capture
the B-S-effect. If the B-S-effect in the Czech Republic was an issue, the parameter
should be at least positive as the higher productivity growth in the tradable sector
relative to the non-tradable sector the higher should be the pressure on wages in
the latter and thus on the overall CPI. This seems not to be the case in the Czech
Republic and our results thus replicate the findings in the existing literature.
This resulting parsimonious model was rather robust to alternative definitions of the
variables and also to the initial specification of the model.38 The results changed
slightly though, if we employed the natural rate of interest obtained by Horva´th
(2007) as can be seen in Table 3.2. Unlike in the previous model this time the BMA
procedure did not select any of the two, not easily interpretable regressors - the
productivity differential and the twelfth lag of the regulated prices inflation. Other
than that, the remaining variables showed up at the same lags and the coefficients
38We did not experiment only with various alternative definitions of the variables but also with
the number of variables initially included.
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have the same signs and similar magnitudes as before. Only the long-run effect of
the inflation of regulated prices amounts now to 0.058. The inclusion probability
of all other factors did not surpass the prior threshold to enter the final equation.
Hence, according to our estimates neither fiscal policy (including VAT changes),
nor cyclical factors, nor the richer growing households seem to be accelerating the
inflation. Moreover, external factors also appear to matter very little. In particular,
in line with the existing literature also in our results the exchange rate pass-through
turns out to be rather weak so that the lack of the appreciating currency after
the euro adoption should have no dramatic impact on inflation. In contrast, our
results provide very little support for the exchange rate expectation being a relevant
inflation determinant - a result that seems to contradict conclusions drawn by other
studies on the euro area. In further research may be alternative measures of inflation
expectations should be tested to shed more light on this issue.39
39The modelling system of the Czech National Bank (CNB) assumes that inflation expectations
are formed predominantly by the latest inflation developments and to a lesser extent by the forecast
for future inflation in a ratio of 90:10 (see Box in CNB’ Inflation Report, January 2005). Hence, it
could be argued that in a way inflation expectations are captured by the lagged inflation variable.
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3.5 Summary and conclusions
In the present chapter we analyse relevant macro and microeconomic forces driving
inflation in the Czech Republic with a particular focus on the question how these
inflation channels are likely to change in the wake of the euro adoption. After a
qualitative discussion we employ an ARDL model. Since standard model selection
criteria disagree, following the recommendations made in the theoretical literature
for such cases we combine all models under an appropriate weighting scheme by us-
ing the Bayesian Model Averaging algorithm while we reduce the intractably large
model space by the Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model Composite algorithm. Our
paper is innovative in one more aspect since we estimate as a side-product the time-
varying natural rate of interest by means of an unobserved components model both
from the actual series as well as from a series purged from the risk premia.
We do not find much evidence underpinning the line of argument usually put for-
ward according to which inflation will rise because of the absence of the appreciating
koruna. In line with the existing literature also in our results the exchange rate pass
through appears rather weak which implies a faster price level convergence in case
of a currency appreciation but a negligible dampening effect on the CPI inflation.
In other words, the costs attributable to the lack of koruna appreciation after euro
adoption are likely to be rather low. Not surprisingly, a low inflation environment is
very supportive for future inflation rates. Inflation also seems quite sensitive to devi-
ations from the natural interest rate. Hence, an essential prerequisite for a smooth
inflation development after the euro adoption is a harmonization of the inflation
and the business cycles between the Czech Republic and the euro area, and thus
consequently of the natural interest rates.
In addition, empirical results as well as anecdotal evidence from some current euro
area members advise that for the sake of a sustainably stable inflation the fulfilment
of the Maastricht inflation criterion should not be enforced by withholding price
deregulations, reducing indirect taxes or by other non-standard policy measures such
as gentlemen’s agreements with the private sector or labor unions. As regards the
inflationary effect of the changeover although the price increases that occurred were
transitory in most cases, theory and past experience suggest that there are better
and worse ways to handle the undoubtedly luring risks of abuses for price hikes. If
possible, an easy conversion rate, a sufficiently long dual pricing and replacement
period as well as fair-pricing agreements with the private sector proved helpful.
Negative publicity in the media enhanced by the set-up of price observatories and
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hotlines also reduce incentives to take advantage of the event. In contrast, inflation
perceptions are a very different story and given the well documented loss aversion
in people’s minds it is a challenging task to tackle the rife and deeply embedded
opinion that the euro raises prices. Probably not much more can be done but a
balanced, transparent and fair information campaign on the inflation aspects of the
euro.
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3.6 Appendix
Parameter estimates
ρ 0.841
λ 0.326
Σu 0.829332
Σω 0.035163
Residual analysis
Std. error 0.96426
DW 1.841
Table 3.3: Univariate unobserved components model
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Dep. Var.: Interest rate spread btw. CR and EMu
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares
Sample (adj.) 1999/M01 2006/M12
Incl. observations: 96 after adjustments
Instrument list Output gap(-6 to -12), Inf. expectation diff.(-6 to -12)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
const. −1.549415 0.279479 −5.543945 0.0000
Output gap −26.84044 10.15148 −2.643994 0.0096
Inf. expectation diff. 0.463972 0.060047 7.726780 0.0000
R2 0.658006
adj. R2 0.650651
DW 0.079463
Table 3.4: Risk premium estimation
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Appendix A
Deutsche Zusammenfassung der
vorliegenden Dissertationsarbeit
Der Wechselkurs ist einer der Schlu¨sselpreise in jeder Volkswirtschaft. Er u¨bt einen
wichtigen Einfluss auf viele wichtige makroo¨konomische Variablen aus, indem er
unmittelbar das Verhalten und den Entscheidungsprozess der Wirtschaftsagenten
wie der Haushalte, Unternehmen, Regierungen und Finanzinstitutionen beeinflusst.
Auf der einen Seite kann der Wechselkurs als ein bedeutender Anker und Stabil-
isator fungieren. Auf der anderen Seite birgt jedes Wechselkursregime vor allem vor
dem Hintergrund der zunehmend globalisierten Kapitalflu¨sse seine charakteristis-
chen Risiken. Die vorliegende Dissertation setzt sich in drei Kapiteln mit zwei spezi-
fischen, wechselkursregimeverwandten Risikoaspekten auseinander - der Gefahr einer
Wa¨hrungskrise und der Mo¨glichkeit einer durch die Euroeinfu¨hrung hervorgerufenen
Inflationsbeschleunigung, die in den meisten Eurokandidatenla¨ndern heftig disku-
tiert wird.
Im ersten Kapitel wird ein Model pra¨sentiert, mit dessen Hilfe man die Zinsstruk-
tur im In- und Ausland zur Scha¨tzung der relativen, von den Marktteilnehmern
wahrgenommenen Wa¨hrungskrisenwahrscheinlichkeit heranziehen kann. Der en-
twickelte Fru¨hwarnindikator signalisiert somit die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Krise
in den na¨chsten sieben Tagen relativ zu dem Rest des Monats. Anschließend wird
gezeigt, dass ein auf diese Weise konstruierter Indikator mehrere signifikante Sig-
nale vor den Wa¨hrungskrisen in Tschechien 1997 und in Russland ein Jahr spa¨ter
gesendet ha¨tte.
Auch das zweite Kapitel bescha¨ftigt sich mit dem Thema Fru¨hwarnmechanismen fu¨r
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Wa¨hrungskrisen. Es wird aufgezeigt, wie man in einem Logit-basierten Fru¨hwarnmodel
im Unterschied zu der bisherigen Literatur explizit Modelunsicherheit beru¨cksichtigen
kann und wie dadurch die Ergebnisse beeinflusst werden. Mittels Bayesianischer
Techniken wird somit sowohl fu¨r statische als auch dynamische Modelle die Ro-
bustheit der, in der Literatur vorgeschlagenen, Erkla¨rungsvariablen getestet. Wenn
man versucht, den genauen Krisenzeitpunkt zu erkla¨ren, stellt Modelunsicherheit
die u¨blichen fundamentalen Krisendeterminanten in Frage. Die Resultate kommen
denen in der existierenden Literatur na¨ her, wenn man nicht Krisenzeitpunkte, son-
dern Krisenzeitfenster erkla¨rt. Bei einer solchen Definition der abha¨ngigen Variable
scheinen insbesondere die reale U¨berbewertung sowie Finanzmarktindikatoren einen
starken Effekt auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Wa¨hrungskrise auszuu¨ben.
Das letzte Kapitel widmet sich dagegen dem Thema einer potentiellen, durch die
Einfu¨hrung der Gemeinschaftswa¨hrung hervorgerufenen Inflationsbeschleunigung.
Am Fallbeispiel der Tschechischen Republik werden somit inflationsrelevante makro-
und mikroo¨konomische Faktoren analysiert mit einem Fokus auf die Frage, wie
sich deren Einfluss auf die Inflation im Zuge der Euroeinfu¨hrung vera¨ndern wird.
Methodologisch bedient man sich dazu eines mit Bayesianischen Techniken kom-
binierten ‘autoregressive distributed lag’ (ARDL) Models. Als Nebenprodukt wird
zum ersten Mal fu¨r die Tschechische Republik ein zeitvariabler, um die Risikopra¨mie
bereinigter natu¨rlicher Zinssatz gescha¨tzt. Die Ergebnisse deuten an, dass Kosten,
die durch den Verlust einer nominellen Trendaufwertung der Koruna gegenu¨ber dem
Euro entstehen, eher moderat sein du¨rften. Dagegen spielen niedrige Inflation-
sraten und eine mo¨glichst gute Abstimmung der Wirtschaftszyklen in Tschechien
und der Eurozone eine Schlu¨sselrolle fu¨r eine glatte Inflationsentwicklung nach der
Eurou¨bernahme. Nichtsdestotrotz, das Erfu¨llen der Maastrichter Inflationskriteri-
ums sollte nicht durch außergewo¨hnliche politische Maßnahmen erzwungen wer-
den. Der potentielle Inflationa¨re Effekt des physischen Bargeldtausches kann zwar
wahrscheinlich nicht komplett eliminiert, aber wenigstens deutlich reduziert werden.
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